

Committee: Financial Investment Board Audit and Risk Management Committee	Date: 22 November 2018 12 March 2019
Subject: Mid-Year Treasury Management Review 2018-19	Public
Report of: The Chamberlain	For Information
Report author: James Graham – Chamberlain’s Dept.	

Summary

The Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy for 2018/19 was approved by the Financial Investment Board and the Finance Committee in February 2018 and by the Court of Common Council on 8 March 2018 and came into effect on 8 March 2018. This allowed the City to make investments of £50M each in two short dated bond funds (Legal & General and Royal London) before the end of the financial year.

Under CIPFA’s Code of Practice on Treasury Management, which was adopted by the Court of Common Council on 3 March 2010, there is a requirement to provide a mid-year review. The main points to note are as follows:

- As at 30 September 2018, the City had cash balances totalling £885.4m. Most of the balances are held for payment to third parties or are restricted reserves.
- No approved counterparty limits were breached during the first half of 2018/19 and the City has experienced no liquidity concerns.
- A total of £100M has been invested in two short dated bond funds
- There may be a requirement to undertake external borrowing on behalf of City’s Cash during 2018/19 but this is under review. At this stage it is not anticipated that City Fund will require any external borrowing during the remainder of the financial year.

Recommendation

Members are asked to note the report.

Main Report

Introduction

1. The City of London Corporation (the City) is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the City's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
2. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of capital expenditure plans. The City anticipates that there may be a requirement to undertake external borrowing on behalf of City's Cash for capital purposes 2018/19. The City does not at this stage anticipate any external borrowing in the remainder of 2018/19 in respect of the City Fund.
3. The City's treasury management activities are undertaken in accordance with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised 2017) which was adopted by the Court of Common Council on 3 March 2010.
4. The City defines its treasury management activities as:

The management of the organisation's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.

Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy Update

5. The Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy for 2018/19 was approved by the Financial Investment Board (1 February 2018), the Finance Committee (20 February 2018) and the Court of Common Council (8 March 2018).
6. It came into effect on 8 March 2018 thus allowing the City to invest £50M each into two short dated bond funds, one with Legal & General and one with Royal London prior to the end of the financial year.

Investment Portfolio

7. It is the City's priority to ensure security of capital and liquidity, and to obtain an appropriate level of return which is consistent with its risk appetite. The pace of increases to the Bank of England's base rate remains the key determinant driving returns in the UK sterling money markets. The Bank's Monetary Policy Committee increased interest rates from 0.5% to 0.75% at its meeting in August 2018, and the change has subsequently led to a marginal improvement in the

returns available on the City's treasury investments. However, interest rates remain at historic lows compared to the previous decade and this situation continues to depress the City's investment income.

8. The City held £885.4m of investments as at 30 September 2018 (£790.5m at 31 March 2018). Most of the balances are held for payment to third parties or are restricted reserves. The average rate of return on the City's treasury management portfolio at the end of September was 0.82%.
9. No approved counterparty limits were breached during the first half of 2018/19 and the City has experienced no liquidity concerns. The Treasury Management Strategy remains appropriate in enabling the City to pursue its prime objectives of security and liquidity, followed by yield.

Regulatory Guidance

10. The regulatory framework for treasury management in local government was updated in December 2017 and February 2018, with several key documents being revised including:
 - The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government's Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments (2018)
 - MHCLG's Statutory Guidance on Minimum Revenue Provision (2018)
 - The CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice (2017)
 - The CIPFA Prudential Code for Capital Finance (2017)
11. Local authorities must follow the statutory guidance in their first strategies presented to full Council after 1 April 2018 and comply with the CIPFA codes from 2019/20. Therefore, the City will adopt full compliance in the 2019/20 Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy.

Borrowing Strategy

12. The City anticipates that there may be a requirement to undertake external borrowing on behalf of City's Cash for capital purposes in 2018/19 and proposals are currently under review. The City does not at this stage anticipate any external borrowing in the remainder of 2018/19 in respect of the City Fund.

Economic Review

13. A detailed commentary on the economy and interest rates as provided by Link Asset Services (the City's Treasury Management advisors) can be found at Appendix 1.
14. With the domestic economy developing broadly in line with the Bank of England's expectations in Q2, the Monetary Policy Committee voted unanimously to increase Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.75% in August 2018. Although growth has been modest in 2018, the Bank has employed some policy tightening to manage

above target inflation. The Bank now expects GDP to grow by 1.3% for 2018 as a whole and 1.7% in 2019.

15. Following the MPC's November meeting, the City's treasury management advisors, Link, issued revised interest rate forecasts and now expect the Bank of England to increase base rates to 1.00% in May 2019 (previously August 2019). The MPC has repeatedly stated that any interest rate increases will be gradual. There remains uncertainty over the UK's withdrawal from the European Union and this, amongst other risks, could have an impact on the direction of any interest changes. A summary of salient risks to the forecast is included in Appendix 1.

Conclusion

16. The City has effectively executed the 2018/19 Treasury Management Strategy during the first six months of the year. The investment strategy remains appropriate for the second half of the year.

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Economy and Interest rates Commentary

James Graham

Group Accountant – Pensions & Treasury Management

T: 020 7332 1137

E: James.Graham@cityoflondon.gov.uk

Commentary on the Economy and Interest Rates provided by Link Asset Services

Economics update

UK. The first half of 2018/19 has seen UK **economic growth** post a modest performance, but sufficiently robust for the Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), to unanimously (9-0) vote to increase **Bank Rate** on 2nd August from 0.5% to 0.75%. Although growth looks as if it will only be modest at around 1.3% in 2018, the Bank of England's November Quarterly Inflation Report forecast that growth will pick up to 1.7% in 2019, albeit there were several caveats – mainly related to whether or not the UK achieves an orderly withdrawal from the European Union in March 2019.

Some MPC members have expressed concerns about a build-up of **inflationary pressures**, particularly with the pound falling in value again against both the US dollar and the Euro. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measure of inflation rose unexpectedly from 2.4% in June to 2.7% in August due to increases in volatile components, but is expected to fall back to 2.1%, near the 2% inflation target, over the next two years given a scenario of minimal increases in Bank Rate. The MPC has indicated Bank Rate would need to be in the region of 1.5% by March 2021 for inflation to stay on track. Financial markets are currently pricing in the next increase in Bank Rate for the second quarter of 2019.

As for the **labour market**, unemployment has continued at a 43 year low of 4% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure. A combination of job vacancies hitting an all-time high in July, together with negligible growth in total employment numbers, indicates that employers are now having major difficulties filling job vacancies with suitable staff. It was therefore unsurprising that wage inflation picked up to 2.9%, (3 month average regular pay, excluding bonuses) and to a one month figure in July of 3.1%. This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 0.4%, near to the joint high of 0.5% since 2009. (The previous high point was in July 2015.) Given the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. This tends to confirm that the MPC were right to start on a cautious increase in Bank Rate in August as it views wage inflation in excess of 3% as increasing inflationary pressures within the UK economy. However, the MPC will need to tread cautiously before increasing Bank Rate again, especially given all the uncertainties around Brexit.

In the **political arena**, there is a risk that the current Conservative minority government may be unable to muster a majority in the Commons over Brexit. However, our central position is that Prime Minister May's government will endure, despite various setbacks, along the route to Brexit in March 2019. If, however, the UK faces a general election in the next 12 months, this could result in a potential loosening of monetary policy and therefore medium to longer dated gilt yields could rise on the expectation of a weak pound and concerns around inflation picking up.

USA. President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy is fuelling a (temporary) boost in consumption which has generated an upturn in the rate of strong growth which rose from 2.2%, (annualised rate), in quarter 1 to 4.2% in quarter 2, but also an upturn in

inflationary pressures. With inflation moving towards 3%, the Fed increased rates another 0.25% in September to between 2.00% and 2.25%, this being four increases in 2018, and indicated they expected to increase rates four more times by the end of 2019. The dilemma, however, is what to do when the temporary boost to consumption wanes, particularly as the recent imposition of tariffs on a number of countries' exports to the US, (China in particular), could see a switch to US production of some of those goods, but at higher prices. Such a scenario would invariably make any easing of monetary policy harder for the Fed in the second half of 2019.

EUROZONE. Growth was unchanged at 0.4% in quarter 2, but has undershot early forecasts for a stronger economic performance in 2018. In particular, data from Germany has been mixed and it could be negatively impacted by US tariffs on a significant part of manufacturing exports e.g. cars. For that reason, although growth is still expected to be in the region of 2% for 2018, the horizon is less clear than it seemed just a short while ago.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Interest rate forecasts

The City's treasury advisor, Link Asset Services, has provided the following forecast:

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View														
	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22
Bank Rate View	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	2.00%
3 Month LIBID	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%
6 Month LIBID	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%
12 Month LIBID	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

The flow of generally positive economic statistics after the end of the quarter ended 30 June meant that it came as no surprise that the MPC came to a decision on 2 August to make the first increase in Bank Rate above 0.5% since the financial crash, to 0.75%. However, the MPC emphasised again, that future Bank Rate increases would be gradual and would rise to a much lower equilibrium rate, (where monetary policy is neither expansionary or contractionary), than before the crash; indeed they gave a figure for this of around 2.5% in ten years' time but they declined to give a medium term forecast. We do not think that the MPC will increase Bank Rate in February 2019, ahead of the deadline in March for Brexit. However, in view of the hawkish stance of the MPC in November, we have moved forward our first increase in

Bank Rate from August 2019 to May 2019. The next increases then occur in February and November 2020 before ending up at 2.0% in February 2022. Financial markets are now expecting a first increase in February 2019 and then further increases only in February 2020 and then May 2021, to end 21/22 at only 1.50%. However, the cautious pace of even these limited increases is dependent on a reasonably orderly Brexit.

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are broadly dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Brexit** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England monetary policy** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**, possibly **Italy**, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system, and due to the election in March of a government which has made a lot of anti-austerity noise. At the time of writing, the EU has rejected the proposed Italian budget and has demanded cuts in government spending which the Italian government has refused. The rating agencies have started on downgrading Italian debt to one notch above junk level. If Italian debt were to fall below investment grade, many investors would be unable to hold Italian debt. Unsurprisingly, investors are becoming increasingly concerned by the actions of the Italian government and consequently, Italian bond yields have risen sharply – at a time when the government faces having to refinance large amounts of debt maturing in 2019.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**. Italian banks are particularly vulnerable; one factor is that they hold a high level of Italian government debt - debt which is falling in value. This is therefore undermining their capital ratios and raises the question of whether they will need to raise fresh capital to plug the gap.
- **German minority government**. In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. Then in October 2018, the results of the Bavarian and Hesse state elections radically undermined the SPD party and showed a sharp fall in support for the CDU. As a result, the SPD is reviewing whether it can continue to support a coalition that is so damaging to its electoral popularity. After the result of the Hesse state election, Angela Merkel announced that she would not stand for re-election as CDU party leader at her party's convention in December 2018. However, this makes little practical difference as she is still expected to aim to continue for now as the Chancellor. However, there are five more state elections coming up in 2019 and EU parliamentary elections in May/June; these could result in a further loss of

electoral support for both the CDU and SPD which could also undermine her leadership.

- **Other minority eurozone governments.** Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium all have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile. Sweden is also struggling to form a government due to the anti-immigration party holding the balance of power, and which no other party is willing to form a coalition with.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU while **Italy**, this year, has also elected a strongly anti-immigration government. Elections to the EU parliament are due in May/June 2019.
- Further increases in interest rates in the US could spark a **sudden flight of investment funds** from more risky assets e.g. shares, into bonds yielding a much improved yield. In October 2018, we have seen a sharp fall in equity markets but this has been limited, as yet. Emerging countries which have borrowed heavily in dollar denominated debt, could be particularly exposed to this risk of an investor flight to safe havens e.g. UK gilts.
- There are concerns around the level of **US corporate debt** which has swollen massively during the period of low borrowing rates in order to finance mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in the debt of many large corporations being downgraded to a BBB credit rating, close to junk status. Indeed, 48% of total investment grade corporate debt is now rated at BBB. If such corporations fail to generate profits and cash flow to reduce their debt levels as expected, this could tip their debt into junk ratings which will increase their cost of financing and further negatively impact profits and cash flow.
- **Geopolitical risks**, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

- **Brexit** – if both sides were to agree a compromise that removed all threats of economic and political disruption.
- **The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets** through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of QE, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation**, whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.