

# PEEL

## Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19

An inspection of City of London Police



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# What this report contains

This report is structured in four parts:

1. Our overall assessment of the force's 2018/19 performance.
2. Our judgments and summaries of how effectively, efficiently and legitimately the force keeps people safe and reduces crime.
3. Our judgments and any areas for improvement and causes of concern for each component of our inspection.
4. Our detailed findings for each component.

## Our inspection approach

In 2018/19, we adopted an [integrated PEEL assessment](#) (IPA) approach to our existing PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) inspections. IPA combines into a single inspection the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL. These areas had previously been inspected separately each year.

As well as our inspection findings, our assessment is informed by our analysis of:

- force data and management statements;
- risks to the public;
- progress since previous inspections;
- findings from our non-PEEL inspections;
- how forces tackle serious and organised crime locally and regionally; and
- our regular monitoring work.

We inspected all forces in four areas:

- protecting vulnerable people;
- firearms capability;
- planning for the future; and
- ethical and lawful workforce behaviour.

We consider the risk to the public in these areas important enough to inspect all forces every year.

We extended the risk-based approach that we used in our 2017 effectiveness inspection to the efficiency and legitimacy parts of our IPA inspections. This means that in 2018/19 we didn't inspect all forces against all areas. The table below shows the areas we inspected City of London Police against.


<b>IPA area</b>	<b>Inspected in 2018/19?</b>
Preventing crime and anti-social behaviour	No
Investigating crime	Yes
Protecting vulnerable people	Yes
Tackling serious and organised crime	Yes
Firearms capability	Yes
Meeting current demands	No
Planning for the future	Yes
Treating the public fairly	Yes
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	Yes
Treating the workforce fairly	No

Our 2017 judgments are still in place for the areas we didn't inspect in 2018/19.

# Force in context


## 999 calls per 1,000 population

1 April 2017 to 30 September 2018



## Recorded crime per 1,000 population


1 April 2017 to 30 September 2018



## City of London workforce

in post on 31 March, 2014 to 2018

● Police community support officer ● Police officer ● Police staff



# Overall summary

 Effectiveness		Last inspected
Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour		2017/18
Investigating crime		2018/19
Protecting vulnerable people		2018/19
Tackling serious and organised crime		2018/19
Armed policing	Ungraded	2018/19
 Efficiency		Last inspected
Meeting current demands and using resources		2017/18
Planning for the future		2018/19



## Legitimacy



Requires improvement

Last inspected

Fair treatment of the public



Requires improvement

2018/19

Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour



Requires improvement

2018/19

Fair treatment of the workforce



Good

2017/18

## **HM Inspector's observations**

I am satisfied by most aspects of City of London Police's performance. But the force needs to make improvements in its legitimacy to provide a consistently good service.

The force is good at preventing and investigating crime. It works effectively with partners to identify and protect vulnerable people.

The force understands demand well. But further work is needed to address the budget gap over the rest of the medium-term financial plan and the force's workforce plans need to be completed.

The force continues to uphold an ethical culture and promote standards of professional behaviour well. But the force has more to do to assure itself that it has the capacity and capability to root out corruption.

Also, the force should make sure it has the necessary systems in place to reassure the public that it carries out stop and searches legitimately.

I am encouraged by the progress that City of London Police has made. I look forward to a more consistent performance over the coming year.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matt Parr".

**Matt Parr**

HM Inspector of Constabulary

# Effectiveness



# Force in context

**Proportion of officers in a neighbourhood or response function**  
in post on 31 March 2018

City of London

England and Wales


17%

39%


## Victim-based crime

12 months ending 30 September 2018

City of London




England and Wales




### **Proportion of crimes where action was taken**

12 months ending 30 September 2018




### **Proportion of crimes where suspect was identified**

12 months ending 30 September 2018



### **Proportion of crimes where victim did not support police action**

12 months ending 30 September 2018



# How effectively does the force reduce crime and keep people safe?



**Good**

## **Summary**

The force is good at preventing crime and tackling [anti-social behaviour](#). This judgment has been carried over from our last inspection in 2017/18.

The force is also good at investigating crime. Its economic crime victim care unit provides excellent support. However, its victim satisfaction rate has fallen this year as officers have less time to spend with victims.

The force has a comprehensive understanding of vulnerability in its area. A specialist nurse supports officers in dealing with incidents related to mental health.

The force's handling of domestic abuse has improved during the last year. However, it still needs to improve how it shares information with schools about children who may have witnessed domestic abuse.

In relation to tackling [serious and organised crime](#), the force does some particularly good work on fraud and cyber-enabled crime.

However, it needs to improve its understanding of other forms of serious and organised crime, particularly drug dealing and [county lines](#).


## **Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour**



**Good**

This question was not subject to detailed inspection in 2018/19, and our judgment from the 2017 effectiveness inspection has been carried over.

## Investigating crime



### Good

The force is good at investigating crime. It has enough detectives to meet its demand as it has recently transferred in a number of detectives from other forces. They are all trained to a high standard. Its economic crime victim care unit provides excellent support.

However, it needs to improve the way it uses its crime recording and management system to manage its case files and investigative processes better. It is still not using a new system consistently, and as a result is making mistakes. It has taken almost a year to put old records onto the new system.

Also, its victim satisfaction rate has fallen this year for those who are not victims of economic crime or vulnerable victims. Officers have less time to spend with victims than they used to.

But the force is good at catching criminals. Since 2016, the force has almost halved its number of 'wanted' persons.

#### Area for improvement

- The force should improve its use of its crime-recording and management system to better manage its case files and investigative processes.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Investigation quality

City of London Police investigates crime well. The force splits its investigative functions into three components: economic crime investigation, other crime investigation, and information and intelligence. Crime investigations are always allocated to appropriately trained officers and staff. The force has recently transferred in a number of detectives from other forces, and now has enough to meet its demand. Detectives have completed all national training requirements for their roles, and they are offered a broad range of continuing professional development, such as working on complex crimes from other forces.

Because the force area is small, officers can attend each crime scene and gather evidence early. Trained forensic staff and detectives are always on call. Our review of crime files found that in 48 out of 60 cases there had been an effective investigation, and 59 out of 60 cases had been investigated by the most appropriate team. Our interviews with officers and further testing of case files found supervision and investigations to be of a high standard.

But the force needs to improve the way it uses its system for managing case files and investigation processes. A new system was introduced in late 2017 and the force is

still not using it consistently. We found mistakes in the way the force had allocated some crimes and recorded supervision and victim contact. Despite this, we found a good level of supervision, particularly in the public protection unit.

An economic crime victim care unit provides excellent support to vulnerable victims especially those who have reported a crime that was not investigated further, either due to a lack of evidence or a very low probability of catching those responsible. The victim care unit has extended this support to vulnerable victims from two other forces, in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands, and there are plans to extend the service to other forces this year.

Victims who do not fall into either of two categories (i.e. they are not victims of economic crime or vulnerable victims) reported lower levels of satisfaction with the service in 2018 than they did the year before. Officers told us this is partly due to the force disbanding the team that supports victims after a suspect has been charged. The officers who conduct the investigation now support victims and keep them updated. Officers also told us that because of increased workloads they can spend less time with victims than they used to. As part of its transformation project, the force should look for ways to address the decline in victim satisfaction.

Among all the forces in England and Wales, City of London Police has the lowest percentage of cases against known suspects discontinued because the witness does not support a prosecution. The average rate across England and Wales is 15.52 percent, whereas for City of London Police it is 5.21 percent. But while this is positive, the picture is not so good in cases where a suspect has not been identified and the victim doesn't support a prosecution. At 9.09 percent, the force has one of the highest rates for ending an investigation compared with an England and Wales rate of 4.61 percent.

### Catching criminals

Since 2016, the force has almost halved its number of 'wanted' persons, from 246 to 126. Supervisors regularly brief officers about wanted persons, and work closely with the public protection unit to find them.

Between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2018, 502 suspects were [released under investigation](#). Officers monitor them regularly. However, it has taken almost a year to put old records onto the new system. The force routinely works with the Home Office immigration enforcement team, as there are a large number of building sites and cafes in the City of London where people have been found to be working illegally.

The [disclosure](#) process in criminal prosecutions is crucial in ensuring a fair trial, and City of London Police is collaborating with the other London forces to make sure officers and staff fulfil their disclosure obligations. Police investigations must follow all reasonable lines of enquiry, including those that point away from the suspect. Prosecutors must provide the defence with any material that undermines the case for the prosecution or assists the case for the defence.

The force is part of a pan-London group of police forces and other criminal justice bodies that has been set up to deal with the disclosure problems seen in London and elsewhere in England and Wales. City of London Police now has 'disclosure champions' who review cases and offer advice and guidance to officers. All officers

and staff attend a one-day disclosure training session and officers complete an online training course. Officers from the economic crime department attend a higher-level disclosure course, which is important in complex financial investigations.

## Protecting vulnerable people



### Good

The force has a comprehensive understanding of vulnerability in its area, including hidden vulnerability – for example, modern slavery on building sites and sex workers in pop-up brothels. It safeguards vulnerable victims to a high standard.

Call handlers assess callers for vulnerability. Even though the command and control system does not automatically identify repeat callers, officers and staff manually check other systems for signs of vulnerability. It gives them good advice about staying safe and preserving evidence. Domestic abuse risk assessments we reviewed were found to be of a high quality.

The force responds well to incidents that involve someone with mental health problems. It works well with other agencies to assess and respond to these incidents. A specialist nurse supports officers in dealing with incidents related to mental health.

The force's handling of domestic abuse has improved during the last year. However, it still needs to improve how it shares information with schools regarding children who may have witnessed domestic abuse. It also needs a more effective system for collecting feedback from vulnerable victims.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should implement a process to get feedback from vulnerable victims.
- The force should implement the necessary processes to share information with schools in relation to children affected by domestic abuse incidents, to ensure information is shared as quickly and effectively as possible.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Understanding and identifying vulnerability

Protecting vulnerable people is one of City of London Police's top priorities. The force has a clear definition of vulnerability and has plans in place to support vulnerable people. It works with the City of London Corporation, local health services and charities to make sure vulnerable people receive the services they need.

The force has a comprehensive understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability in its area. Officers look out for hidden forms of vulnerability, for example modern slavery on building sites and cafes and sex workers in pop-up brothels. The force has commissioned research on hidden vulnerability and briefs its officers about what to

look for. It has also assessed future demand relating to people with mental health issues and missing people and is planning accordingly.

Call handlers identify vulnerable victims promptly. Most calls for the force are taken by the Metropolitan Police Service, and the reports are sent to the City of London Police control room. Although the force's command and control system does not automatically identify repeat callers, officers and staff manually check other systems for vulnerability. An intelligence officer is always present in the control room to look for vulnerability and risk in the open call logs, and to provide officers attending incidents with extra information. This helps officers and staff make good decisions about threat and risk.

The force attends all calls for service from the public, which is almost unheard of in other forces. It had no backlog of calls or incidents awaiting a police response when we visited the control room during our inspection. We saw call handlers giving victims good advice about staying safe and preserving evidence, and they can request expert advice easily through an on-call system in the control room.

### **Responding to incidents**

Officers usually respond to incidents involving vulnerable victims quickly enough to keep them safe. The force covers a small area, and it has recently increased the number of officers with cycle training, because this is the fastest way to reach victims in busy traffic.

When officers arrive at a domestic abuse scene, they mostly do a thorough job of assessing the victim's vulnerability, and also recognise the risks relating to other people in the household. We reviewed a small number of domestic abuse risk assessments and found them to be of a high quality. The force has a thorough, three-stage review process for domestic abuse risk assessments, which means it is unlikely to miss vulnerable victims. The assessments are checked by the first-line supervisor, by the duty inspector and then again by the public protection unit supervisor to make sure they include appropriate safeguarding actions and further support.

Officers from the public protection unit and the duty inspector share information about immediate safeguarding with other agencies such as health, social care and housing. These agencies told us the force shares information in a timely and efficient way.

As the force covers a busy central London area with many vulnerable people on the streets, a high proportion of the incidents it attends involve mental health concerns. It works well with other agencies to assess and respond to these incidents. A mental health nurse is deployed with the police response vehicles between 7.00pm and 3.00am each night to help deal with any cases involving mental health. The nurse can decide whether somebody needs assessment, and can access medical records and secure facilities more quickly than a police officer. The force has monitored this practice over six months to assess its effectiveness and has now given it stable funding.

Response officers use arrest and [voluntary attendance](#), in which suspects can attend a police station at an appointed time, in line with the rest of England and Wales forces. Its use of arrest is 87.18 percent compared with the England and Wales arrest rate of

90.51 percent, and its use of voluntary attendance is 12.82 percent compared with the England and Wales rate of 9.49 percent. The force is also in line with the rest of England and Wales forces for its domestic abuse charge rate, which is 14 percent.

### **Supporting vulnerable victims**

City of London Police safeguards vulnerable victims to a high standard. The public protection unit is responsible for safeguarding victims of domestic abuse, supported by neighbourhood officers, while the communities team safeguards victims with mental health issues. The force has an independent vulnerable victims advocate who advises officers about necessary safeguarding measures. Neighbourhood and communities teams visit vulnerable victims regularly, giving them protective advice and helping them make their properties more secure.

Last year, one of the areas for improvement we identified in City of London Police was that the force should share information with schools about children who may have witnessed domestic abuse. Work has commenced to put in place the necessary processes but is not completed yet, which means children may not receive the support they need in school after witnessing a traumatic incident. It therefore remains an area for improvement.

During 2018, the force has much improved its use of legal powers to protect victims of domestic abuse. It has trained officers in how to authorise applications for [domestic violence protection orders](#) and complete the applications. Due to the relatively small resident population in the City of London, most domestic abuse cases involve victims who live outside the force area but are within the City of London when the abuse takes place. In these cases, the force has good processes in place to make sure it carries out the initial safeguarding of victims and efficiently transfers cases to other forces.

As it is a relatively small force, City of London Police does not have a [multi-agency safeguarding hub](#). However, its public protection unit provides the same functions, and all high-risk domestic abuse cases are referred into the [multi-agency risk assessment conference](#).

Last year, we found that the force needed to improve how it collected feedback from vulnerable victims. This year we found that the vulnerable victims advocate collects feedback from domestic abuse victims, and attempts to collect feedback from victims with mental health concerns, but these forms are rarely returned. We did not find evidence of feedback being collected from other vulnerable victims and so this too remains an area for improvement for the force.

The force is good at sharing with other bodies the lessons it learns about its work with vulnerable people. It reviews most incidents involving vulnerable victims and shares this information with other agencies through the force's learning forum and the City of London Corporation, which acts as the local authority for the force.

The force manages a small number of offenders who pose a risk to vulnerable victims, and it does this well. It carries out risk assessments for offenders and reviews them regularly. Most of the registered sex offenders in the City of London are rough sleepers, and the force uses its briefing page to make neighbourhood teams and response officers aware of them. Registered sex offenders are monitored by the public

protection unit, which carries out regular checks to make sure that they are still in the force area and registering as they should. The force has applied for a small number of [sexual harm prevention orders](#) this year to protect victims from dangerous or sex offenders.

## Tackling serious and organised crime



### Good

The force does some particularly good work to combat fraud and cyber-enabled crime. One recent investigation into Bitcoin fraud was identified as best practice that is being shared with other forces. Neighbourhood officers look for signs of modern-day slavery and organised criminals such as those who use aggressive begging tactics. The force is good at publicising successful campaigns and raising awareness about fraud and cyber-enabled crime.

However, it should improve the way it approaches its 'lifetime management' of organised criminals to reduce the risk to local communities. Also, it needs to improve its understanding of other forms of serious and organised crime, particularly drug dealing and county lines. It should take a regional approach to tackling these problems. A new drugs reduction strategy focuses on a co-ordinated response to county lines-related drug dealing with its partner organisations.

The force records disruptions of organised crime groups using the national scale, but it has the lowest number of disruptions per group of all England and Wales forces. This is probably because cases are complex economic crimes so are not straightforward to solve.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should improve its approach to the 'lifetime management' of organised criminals to minimise the risk they pose to local communities. This approach should include routine consideration of ancillary orders, the powers of other organisations and other tools to deter organised criminals from continuing to offend.
- The force should strengthen its response to county lines, which are criminal networks involved in the distribution of drugs to different areas of the country that frequently exploit children and vulnerable people.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

## Understanding threats

The force has a good understanding of serious and organised crime threats, particularly those involving fraud and cyber-enabled crime. It receives detailed information about fraud, money laundering and cyber-enabled crime from banks, businesses and the National Crime Agency, among others, which helps it to assess the threats.<sup>1</sup>

It has identified other organisations that it wants to work with on this issue over the next year, from both the public and private sectors. It maps all new organised crime groups promptly and rescores them consistently and appropriately using national systems. Processes are in place to monitor or escalate the activities of organised crime groups that have been disrupted by the force or have been inactive for a time. The force has archived a large number of organised crime groups and transferred responsibility for others to different forces over the past two years. This has significantly reduced the number of organised crime groups it is responsible for and means that the force can focus more effort on those that it retains.

We found good practice in frontline policing. Neighbourhood officers look for signs of modern-day slavery, and for organised criminals who use aggressive begging tactics or who pretend to be police officers in order to steal. The force also works well with other regional organised crime units. Most recently, it collaborated with the northwest unit on tackling organised criminals from Manchester who were having an impact on the City of London.

However, the force needs to improve its understanding of other organised crimes, particularly drug dealing and county lines. The force's drugs reduction strategy contains detailed information about the threat from drugs and sets out how the force intends to tackle county lines, but this was not yet in place. It is working with the other London forces on specific issues such as children found at train stations, who are being exploited or are vulnerable to exploitation by county lines drug dealers in the force area.

Last year, we found that the force needed to understand county lines better, and it has made some progress in this, including good work with young people at Liverpool Street station. But more needs to be done. The force told us that it did not have the same problems with county lines gangs as other forces, due to its size and location. Local partners also told us that they had not yet come across any people involved in county lines activities.

We found that a small number of officers did not understand county lines activities and were not aware of the signs they should look for. The force should make sure all its frontline officers and staff understand county lines better.

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<sup>1</sup> City of London Police is the national lead force for economic crime, which includes responsibility for Action Fraud and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. In 2018, we inspected the national police response to fraud. In 2019, we published our report of this inspection, called *Fraud: Time to choose*.

## Serious and organised crime prevention

The force tries to identify individuals at risk of being drawn into organised crime. It has a small residential population of approximately 9,000 people and has identified crimes that people in the area may be drawn into, such as boiler room frauds,<sup>2</sup> drug or money trafficking or sex work. People can be referred to an early help group if there are concerns about them financially or socially, including if they are at risk of being drawn into organised crime.

The force told us that there were no gangs resident in the force area, and that most gang members who frequent the City live in neighbouring boroughs and across London. This means the force hasn't used any gang injunctions to prevent youth violence. It does, however, use dispersal orders when it receives intelligence about large numbers of youths meeting in the area if it believes this could lead to violence.

Last year, we found that the force needed to improve its approach to preventing serious and organised criminals from offending. Since then it has carried out detailed analysis of this concern, and at the time of our inspection was recruiting staff to manage a new approach. However, it does not yet have an effective approach to lifetime offender management. It does some work with prisons and probation services to actively manage organised criminals, but this is usually relating to fraud and cyber-enabled crime. It does not currently do this for other crimes, such as drug dealing and violence, but it should. This management could include using additional orders, such as compensation, disqualification or forfeiture, other agency powers and other methods to deter organised criminals from continuing to offend.

The force is taking positive steps to increase its prison intelligence capacity and capability, with a number of new officers trained to work in this environment. This has already had a positive impact by helping the force to combat crime involving online vouchers and gift cards.

In relation to serious crime prevention orders, the force works effectively with its other agencies such as HM Revenue & Customs and organisations in the banking sector to enforce these orders. The force is also good at using other techniques to disrupt organised crime. It recently identified a large number of bogus websites through proactive intelligence work with its partner agencies and took the websites offline.

The force is good at publicising successful campaigns and raising awareness about fraud and cyber-enabled crime. It produces alerts describing criminal methods and how to combat them, based on information from its economic intelligence teams. It also sends out protective advice to other forces, private and public sector organisations, and communities. Our 2018/19 thematic inspection of the police response to fraud looked more extensively at this aspect of City of London Police's work. We published our detailed findings in our report Fraud: Time to Choose.

There are only six schools in the force area, and officers visit each one to talk to children about the dangers of organised crime, among other topics such as online

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<sup>2</sup> A boiler room fraud is where a bogus stockbroker, usually based overseas, cold-calls investors and coerces someone into buying worthless shares. Their favourite targets are middle-aged people with previous experience of buying shares, whose names are on share registers.

grooming and road safety. This demonstrates the force's commitment to improving the national response to organised fraud and cyber-enabled crime. We found much less evidence of awareness-raising in its wider community about other types of serious and organised crime, such as drug trafficking, organised theft and pickpocketing, however. The force should review its awareness campaigns to make sure that they are covering all the necessary areas.

## Disruption and investigation

The force maintains a [serious and organised crime local profile](#), which is used by the City of London Corporation to plan activity by the police and other services. It has an active partnership board structure in place with local partners and the City of London Corporation. It has agreed three priorities for the coming year:

- fraud and cyber-enabled crime;
- modern slavery and domestic servitude; and
- illicit drugs.

The board is supportive and helps the force to focus on these priorities. Its response to fraud and cyber-enabled crime is already good, and it is proactive in its approach to tackling modern slavery. A new drugs reduction strategy, mentioned above, focuses on a co-ordinated response to county lines-related drug dealing with its partners. We will assess the effectiveness of this strategy over the next 12 months.

In a good example of joint working, the force has recently trained all its [lead responsible officers](#), along with officers from the British Transport Police, in how to deal with organised crime groups. Lead responsible officers have access to a broad range of specialist advisers to support them, particularly when investigating economic crimes. The force considers a wide range of covert and overt tactics when dismantling organised criminal operations with links to fraud and cyber-enabled crime. It has tackled organised crime successfully this year, working alongside the national fraud task force and the National Crime Agency.

However, the force needs to scrutinise the work of its lead responsible officers more regularly. A new serious and organised crime board appears to be effective at prioritising new organised crime groups. It has the leadership and planning in place to support effective investigations. But the meeting does not require the lead responsible officers to attend. We could not see how or where they would account for their work. The force should also make sure that all its plans have a [4P](#) approach (pursue, prevent, protect and prepare); the plans we assessed were focused on pursuing criminals, with less detail regarding how to 'protect', 'prevent' and 'prepare'.

The force records disruptions of organised crime groups using the national scale, but it has the lowest number of disruptions per group of all England and Wales forces. This is probably due to the fact that the force usually deals with complex economic crimes, for which disruption may be less straightforward than for other types of organised crime.

Neighbourhood teams have successfully contributed to operations aimed at tackling organised crime groups. This includes one recent case of a Romanian organised crime group involved in aggressive begging. Officers are briefed on the signs they

need to look for and are taking steps to identify organised criminals who operate in the force area.

Last year we said the force needed a better understanding of the impact that it had on serious and organised crime over the medium and long term. We found some improvement in this area this year. The force is measuring its impact more accurately, but it still needs to use its partnership board to get better data from its partners and the other London forces. This would help it allocate resources to tackle all types of serious and organised crime.

The force is good at reviewing its serious and organised crime investigations. It analyses them and shares good practice with other forces. Its recent investigation of Bitcoin fraud is likely to become the standard for all forces to investigate such crimes. By the sharing of good practice, the force is contributing to the national response to serious and organised crime.

## Armed policing

We have previously inspected how well forces provide armed policing. This formed part of our 2016 and 2017 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of organised crime groups or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The [Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons](#) makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a [chief officer](#) be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an [armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment](#) (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

### Understanding the threat and responding to it

City of London Police operates joint arrangements with the Metropolitan Police Service to provide armed policing. This means that the standards of training, armed deployments and command of armed operations between the forces are consistent.

The force has a good understanding of the potential harm facing the public. Its APSTRA conforms to the requirements of the code and the [College of Policing guidance](#). The APSTRA is published annually and is accompanied by a register of risks and other observations. The [designated chief officer](#) reviews the register frequently to maintain the right levels of armed capability and capacity.

Last year we identified an area where the assessment of risk could be improved. We recognise that City of London Police works closely with the Metropolitan Police Service and British Transport Police to provide armed policing in the capital. However, a joint APSTRA as a single point of reference for the three forces does not exist. Such an APSTRA would focus on the entire threat in London and leave the three forces in a stronger position to address it. This remains a shortcoming for the

three forces. However, there are plans in place between the forces to begin joint analysis of threats and risk in April 2019.

All armed officers in England and Wales are trained to national standards. There are different standards for each role that armed officers perform. The majority of armed incidents in City of London Police are attended by officers trained to an armed response vehicle standard. However, incidents sometimes occur that require the skills and specialist capabilities of more highly trained officers.

We found City of London Police has good arrangements in place to mobilise specialist officers should their skills be required. On these occasions, agreements are in place for the capabilities to be provided by specialist officers based within the Metropolitan Police Service.

### **Working with others**

It is important that effective joint working arrangements are in place between neighbouring forces. Armed criminals and terrorists have no respect for county boundaries. As a consequence, armed officers must be prepared to deploy flexibly in the knowledge that they can work seamlessly with officers in other forces. It is also important that any one force can call on support from surrounding forces in times of heightened threat.

The arrangements in place between City of London Police, the Metropolitan Police Service and British Transport Police mean that armed officers can deploy quickly and efficiently in the capital.

We also examined how well prepared forces are to respond to threats and risks. Armed officers in City of London Police are trained in tactics that take account of the types of recent terrorist attacks. Also, City of London Police has an important role in designing training exercises with other organisations that simulate these types of attack. We found that these training exercises are reviewed carefully so that learning points are identified and improvements are made for the future.

In addition to debriefing training exercises, we also found that City of London Police reviews the outcomes of all firearms incidents that officers attend. This helps ensure that best practice or areas for improvement are identified. We also found that this knowledge is used to improve training and operational procedures.


# Efficiency



## Force in context

### Spend per head of population

2013/14 to 2017/18



# How efficiently does the force operate and how sustainable are its services?



**Good**

## **Summary**

The force is good at meeting current demand and using its resources. We have carried this judgment over from our last inspection in 2017. However, the force needs to improve how it plans for the future. In particular, it needs to show how it will address the gap in its budget over the next five years.

The force has a good understanding of how demand for its services is likely to change over time.

The force consults the public well. It has a good understanding of what skills it will need for the future and is good at developing its people.

The force works well with a range of other forces and organisations.

The force's plans are ambitious and innovative and should put it in a strong position for the future. But this can only happen once the force achieves a balanced budget.

## **Meeting current demands and using resources**



**Good**

This question was not subject to detailed inspection in 2018/19, and our judgment from the 2017 effectiveness inspection has been carried over.

## Planning for the future



### Requires improvement

The force needs to improve how it plans for the future. In particular, it needs to show how it will address the deficit in its budget over the next five years.

It has carried out detailed work to evaluate how demand for its services is likely to change over time. It has a long-term plan for how it will address this through a new structure and new ways of working. However, it needs to make sure it can deal with this demand at the same time as addressing the gap in its budget. The force has corrected the mistakes that led to the budget gap, but it still needs to review its plans to address the remaining deficit.

The force consults the public well. It uses its results as a guide to providing services and how it plans its future workforce. It has a good understanding of what skills it will need for the future and is good at developing its people.

The force works well with a range of other forces and organisations. It assesses the benefits of these arrangements as part of its planning.

The force's plans are ambitious and innovative and should put it in a strong position for the future. But this can only happen once the force achieves a balanced budget.

#### Area for improvement

- The force needs to address the deficit it has identified in its medium-term financial plan.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

#### Assessing future demand for services

The force has carried out detailed work to evaluate its future demand. During 2017 external consultants carried out work to assess future demand over the next 5-10 years. It understands there will be an increasing working population with more people travelling through the area, more visitors and an increased number of licensed premises. It has assessed that it will have a 10 percent rise in mental health incidents that it attends, and that cyber-enabled offences will make up over 60 percent of its recorded crime. The force also thinks that artificial intelligence could automate at least 15 percent of its work. Although this assessment provides the force with a strong base to understand its future demand, it must make sure that its demand planning matches the resources it has to address the budget deficit it has identified in its medium-term financial plan.

The force has used the results of a consultant-led demand and value for money review to inform its change plan, known as the 'Transform programme'. This began in January 2018 and is to run over the next two to three years. Its objective is to develop

services against demand and decide which resources will be required in the future. It is intended that a new structure and new ways of working for the force will be agreed by June 2019, with implementation starting in 2020. This is an ambitious plan and considers changes in technology to help it better understand demand, particularly with fraud and cyber-enabled crime. It also considers emerging demand such as the opening of Crossrail which will mean the force needs more resources for the higher numbers of people who will visit the area during the night.

### **Understanding public expectations**

The force has a good understanding of what the public wants and how expectations are changing. It uses this understanding to inform its view of the future and adapts its services appropriately. The force serves a unique community, made up of a small number of residents, a very large number of workers and visitors, and many businesses including banking institutions and commercial enterprises. The force has good links with businesses, residents and workers and it uses well-established meetings to find out what the public wants. The force introduced a new survey process in 2018 that includes both online and street surveys. This doubled the number of people consulted, compared with last year. The force is using this to improve its understanding of public expectations and inform its priorities.

The force uses this understanding of changing public expectations to inform its future plans for recruitment and workforce planning. It recognises that specialist skills to combat fraud and cyber-enabled crime will be required in the future. It is using innovative ways to bring these skills into the force with the use of specialists funded by industry. We think this is good practice and shows the force understands the things that its communities want.

### **Prioritising**

The force has set out a clear vision for the future. Its priorities and plans are informed by its understanding of future demand and changing public expectations. Its Transform programme will involve a period of continuous development that will match resources to demand to meet the priorities it has set out in its policing plan. The force has a comprehensive understanding of its workforce requirements and skills gaps. It is focused on maintaining frontline operational resources and undertakes regular recruitment to ensure that gaps are filled. A recent transferee recruitment campaign brought the detective strength up to establishment.

### **Future workforce**

The force is part way through a very detailed evaluation of its future workforce requirements. It understands the changes in demand it is likely to face and is compiling options as to what the workforce will need to look like to meet that demand. The current workforce strategy is comprehensive and includes leadership development, skills audit, talent management and recruitment plans for its skills gaps. It will also continue to take in officers from other forces.

Based on attrition rates of people leaving and joining, and predicted retirements over the next five years, the force's workforce plan and recruitment strategy aim to recruit 100 probationers and 220 transferees. The force is using its Transform programme to

identify what skills it needs to meet the force's eight strategic objectives (counter terrorism, fraud, cyber-crime, roads policing, public order, anti-social behaviour, vulnerable people, and violent and acquisitive crime). For example, cyber and digital changes mean the workforce will need different skills, requiring officers and staff to increase their technological skills and knowledge. The force sees that, with fewer people choosing a 'career for life' in policing, it needs robust workforce planning processes to ensure continued resilience. The force has staggered its planned recruitment over the next year to meet its savings targets and thereby address its budget shortfall. The force told us this won't change its long-term recruitment plans because these depend on the results of the Transform programme.

The force is ambitious in its plans to increase the size of its special constabulary and to further increase the number of volunteers it has, who bring specialist banking and cyber expertise to the force. The force has made good use of external funding opportunities to fully budget for these plans.

### **Finance plans**

Following its 2010 consultation about revaluing public sector pensions, the government announced, in 2016 and 2018, reductions in the discount rate it uses to set contribution rates for the unfunded public service pension schemes. These include the police service pension scheme. A lower discount rate will result in higher contribution rates for the employer. The official notification of a lower rate in September 2018 did not allow the police committee time to include the impact in their financial planning. In December 2018, the government announced a pension grant for 2019/20. It allocated funding to each force to specifically help the police pay for these increased costs in the next year. The police committee must now plan for how they will finance the increased costs in the following years, assessing the impact on their officer numbers and their ability to provide effective and efficient services.

The revenue medium-term financial plan previously indicated a balanced budget for 2018/19, but with an annual deficit increasing to £5m per annum by 2021/22. However, in late 2018, the force discovered the financial forecasts had been based on incorrect data and flawed assumptions. This included a failure to account for an existing budget gap and the double counting of the national and international city grant. This means the force faced an unbalanced budget for 2018/19 and a more significant deficit over the next five years.

Following further detailed work by the force and the police committee, the budget gap for 2018/19 and 2019/20 has been addressed. The force is using savings it has already made, identified by its Transform programme, and further in-year savings, which include better use of agency workers, staggered recruitment through the year, and the use of additional income from training and support the force provides to other organisations. The police committee holds the reserve for the force and has agreed in principle to find the additional resources to fill the budget gap in the short term. Further work is needed to address the gap over the rest of the medium-term financial plan, which adds up to £12.8m.

## **Leadership and workforce development**

The force is good at developing its workforce and leaders. Its workforce plan is updated every six months to ensure that the force understands its current priorities, demands and threats, mapped against its workforce numbers, skills and demographics. The workforce plan is supported by a five-year recruitment plan, which details the promotion, transferee and other bulk recruitment campaigns to ensure the force meets its demand. There is also a five-year training plan that considers the skills required across the force. All this activity is described in the force's corporate plan.

The force maintains good governance over workforce planning, with structures in place at directorate and force level to scrutinise the filling of existing posts. Talent management schemes are evident and include workplace shadowing and mentoring. The force also has succession plans in place for its senior leadership teams and has used external recruitment successfully over recent years to bring specialisms and experience into the force at senior ranks.

## **Ambition to improve**

The force's plans are ambitious and innovative. The demand and value for money review, the strategic threat and risk assessment process and the Transform programme, plus continued investment in estate and IT, should place the force in a strong position for the future. Resources are in place to achieve change, and the force has achieved savings in the past and continues to identify appropriate areas for efficiencies and investment. But all savings over the foreseeable future will be used to cover the budget shortfall and can't be reinvested in the force. It is too early to make a judgment on the success of the Transform programme. We look forward to assessing this over the next few years.

The force failed to identify flawed planning assumptions in its financial planning during 2017/18. This means the budget gap wasn't recognised until a temporary finance director, who was brought into the force in mid-2018, spent several months reviewing the force's finances. The force and the police committee were told of the shortfall in late 2018 and set up a joint group to review the assumptions made for the 2018/19 budget and for the future years of the financial plan. New measures have been put in place. These include the recruitment of a new finance director who will sit on the management board of the force. Recent work by the force and the police committee to change the structure of the financial management and planning teams appears to be positive. We will assess the impact of these changes over the next year.

The force is part way through its IT transformation programme and has an IT strategy in place to provide it with a reliable, resilient and secure infrastructure. The force recognises that it is currently in deficit with its IT provision. It has an ageing technology infrastructure, some of which is from the last decade. The IT provision is via a managed service with the City of London Corporation. Together, they have plans to provide technology that will improve the force's response to cyber-crime and fraud, and support hot-desking and home working for its staff. The IT renewal phase one, which is underway, is fully funded to £6m. However, the remaining plans, which could total £9m, still require funding to be agreed with the City of London Corporation.

All capital spending plans will need to be reviewed to make sure funding is available for them in light of the revenue budget deficit over the next five years.

The force is involved in a wide range of collaborations, including those with other police forces in the UK and around the world, and public and private organisations, mostly as part of its response to economic crime. In 2017, we said that the force could do more to review the benefits and drawbacks of all its collaborative work and the force has included this as part of its future design planning. The force is now included in the pan-London blue light collaboration programme, which makes the most of its purchasing power.

In 2017, we said that the force should ensure that it understands the level of service that can be provided at different levels of costs. Its annual review of fees and charges 2018/19 has gone some way to identifying the full economic cost per hour of officers and staff, including their available productive hours.


# Legitimacy



# Force in context


## Comparison of City of London workforce ethnicity with local population

as of 31 March 2018



## City of London workforce

in post on 31 March 2018



## Proportion of workforce without up-to-date security clearance

as of 1 April 2018

3%

# How legitimately does the force treat the public and its workforce?



## Requires improvement

### Summary

The force requires improvement in the legitimacy with which it treats the public and its workforce.

Its leaders understand and value the benefits of community engagement. There is a positive culture around ethics and fair decision making, both internally and in dealings with the public.

However, a major problem for the force is a lack of external scrutiny. The local [independent advisory group](#) and the community scrutiny group have not been functioning for some time.

The force's supervision of stop and search has improved during 2018, as has its monitoring of stop and search data. However, it could also do more to analyse its use of [these powers](#).

In relation to ethical and lawful workforce behaviour, the force requires improvement. It needs to improve its anti-corruption assessment and control strategy, which are currently of a low standard. It also needs to improve the capacity and capability of its [counter-corruption units](#).

## Treating the public fairly



### Requires improvement

The force needs to improve the way it treats the public.

Its leaders understand and value the benefits of community engagement. It has a positive culture on ethics and fair decision making, both internally and in dealing with the public. The force tailors its communications to the needs of its communities – using its bilingual officers to translate messages into Urdu for its large Bangladeshi community.

However, a major problem for the force is lack of external scrutiny. The local independent advisory group and the community scrutiny group have not been functioning for some time. It has proved hard to get these groups up and running again due to the small residential population in the area. The force has invited members of similar groups in neighbouring areas to join a new advisory group in the City of London, but this is not yet in place.

The force's supervision of stop and search has improved during 2018. It has also improved its monitoring of stop and search data. However, it could do more to analyse its use of these powers. Its policy on [body-worn video](#) cameras does not state that officers should start recording at the beginning of a stop and search. Also, not all of its workforce has received training in [unconscious bias](#).

#### Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that effective external scrutiny takes place in relation to the its use of force.
- The force should ensure that effective external scrutiny takes place in relation to its stop and search powers.
- The force should extend its unconscious bias training to all its workforce.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Treating people fairly and respectfully

City of London Police leaders understand and value the benefits of community engagement, fairness and transparency in decision making. Fairness is one of the force's values and this is evident in its leadership training. Officers and staff told us they felt empowered to make decisions. We found evidence that the [Code of Ethics](#) and fair decision making are considered in senior management meetings, about areas from finance to operational effectiveness. This positive culture sets a good example for the workforce and encourages them to treat the public fairly.

The force engages well with the public and officers make effective use of social media. The force took advice from other forces about how best to use social media and has

improved this service as a result. It makes sure that its workforce is aware of national guidelines on social media use.

This work is supplemented by a corporate magazine aimed at a public readership. In its latest survey, it asked readers about fairness and respect shown by City of London Police's workforce, among other things. The force will tailor its communications strategy in response to feedback that the public want to use email and social media to communicate.

The force tailors its approach to engagement according to the needs of different communities. There is a large Bangladeshi community in the City of London, and the force is using its bilingual officers to translate community messages into Urdu. The area is also home to many businesses and banks, and the force has found supportive ways to engage with them, such as attending seminars and asking officers to spend time talking to staff.

Both residents and businesses in the local area influence policing priorities. For example, at community meetings people raised concerns over aggressive begging and repeated shoplifting. The force does not have a neighbourhood watch scheme, due to the size and make-up of the City of London. Instead it uses volunteers and the special constabulary to involve local people in its crime prevention and problem-solving activities. The local independent advisory group and the community scrutiny group have not been providing adequate scrutiny for some time, and the force recognises this as a problem. Despite attempts to address this, there have been difficulties attracting local people to take part, due to the small resident population in the area. The force has invited members of similar groups in neighbouring areas to join a new advisory group in the City of London, but this is not yet in place.

Most, but not all, of the workforce receive unconscious bias training, aimed at helping them to identify and overcome any biases they may have. It is part of initial training for new officers, vulnerability training and ongoing stop and search training – but the force should offer this training to all its workforce.

## Using force

In the last 12 months, almost all officers have been trained in how to use force. Those we spoke to could describe how to do so fairly and proportionately. Although it submits its use of force data in line with [National Police Chiefs' Council](#) guidelines, we found during our recent custody inspection that City of London Police does not properly record all the uses of force in custody suites. As a result, it doesn't know the extent to which force is being used fairly and appropriately in custody suites.

The force has a new, comprehensive dataset on this issue, but it doesn't monitor use of force by individual officers. This means that it is difficult for the force to see trends or check that all officers are using force appropriately and fairly. Supervisors do not review CCTV footage from custody or body-worn video footage, and the force's policy on the use of body-worn video cameras does not make it clear to officers when they should turn the recording on.

It is positive that the public can see the whole use of force dataset on City of London Police's website. However, this does not compensate for the lack of effective external scrutiny.

## Using stop and search powers

The supervision of stop and search in the City of London has vastly improved during 2018. Supervisors are now checking stop and search records and referring them back to officers when needed. The force has low numbers of stop and searches and so can scrutinise each record. All officers have received training in stop and search.

We reviewed a representative sample of 452 stop and search records to assess the reasonableness of the recorded grounds. We found that 75 percent had reasonable grounds recorded. Our assessment is based on the grounds recorded by the searching officer and not the grounds that existed at the time of the search.

In our 2017 legitimacy report, we recommended that all forces should:

- monitor and analyse comprehensive stop and search data to understand reasons for disparities;
- take action on those; and
- publish the analysis and the action by July 2018.

We found that the force has complied with some of this recommendation. But it doesn't:

- separately identify drug possession and supply-type offences to understand the extent to which they differ between people from different ethnicities; or
- identify the prevalence of possession-only drug searches and how they align with force-level priorities.

Since last year, the force's monitoring of stop and search data has also improved significantly. Its governance group for stop and search is well attended by members of the force, including training and learning department staff and representatives from staff groups. There is a new stop and search lead, who has brought renewed focus to improving the force's use of these powers. The force published an explanation of the disparity between the use of stop and search on black, Asian and minority ethnic people and others in its public data on its website.

However, there is still room for improvement. The force does not monitor people who are searched numerous times or officers who use stop and search unusually frequently. Nor does it monitor body-worn video footage of stop and search encounters. As mentioned above, the force policy on body-worn video cameras does not state that officers should turn on the recording at the start of a stop and search. The force acknowledges that it needs to do further analysis aimed at improving its use of stop and search.

The force does not currently have effective external scrutiny of stop and search, but it is trying to address this, as outlined above.

## Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour



### Requires improvement

The force needs to improve its ethical and lawful workforce behaviour. Its leaders and workforce understand the Code of Ethics and its principles of integrity, fairness and professionalism. However, the force needs to improve its anti-corruption assessment and control strategy, which are currently of a low standard. It has not yet completed its anti-corruption strategic assessment for 2019. It does not use organisational information such as email accounts and logs from crime reports to identify those who are at risk of corruption.

It also needs to improve the capacity and capability of its counter-corruption units. The anti-corruption unit does not have enough staff to seek out corruption. Also, the force cannot yet fully monitor all its IT systems because the software has limited capability and is not compatible with all the force's IT systems.

The force has not yet addressed an earlier national recommendation to form links with agencies that support victims to look for information about police officers abusing their position for a sexual purpose.

#### Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure its anti-corruption strategic threat assessment and control strategy are comprehensive, up-to-date and include current data.
- The force should ensure that its counter-corruption unit:
  - has enough capability and capacity to counter corruption effectively and proactively;
  - can fully monitor all of its computer systems, including mobile data, to proactively identify data breaches, protect the force's data and identify computer misuse; and
  - builds effective relationships with individuals and organisations that support and work with vulnerable people.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Maintaining an ethical culture

Leaders continue to promote the Code of Ethics with its emphasis on integrity, fairness and professionalism, and the wider workforce understands these principles. The principles set out in the code appear prominently in all strategic documents, such as the policing plan and the corporate plan, and a Code of Ethics impact assessment is also now included in report templates for strategic boards.

The workforce can discuss ethical dilemmas in a variety of different ways. Several officers and staff have volunteered to be members of the challenge forum and are

called ‘ethics associates’. Their role is to raise ethical questions around everyday activities and decisions.

The force is a founding member of the London forces collaborative ethics panel (the London Police Challenge Forum). This has recently been relaunched and we will assess its effectiveness over the next 12 months. The force also has an integrity standards board, which is chaired by the assistant commissioner. This considers individual officers and staff and organisational integrity, and the workforce spoke highly of it. The [professional standards department](#) uses this board to publicise lessons learned from misconduct investigations and grievance complaints.

In 2016, we recommended that, within two years, all members of the police workforce should have received at least the lowest level of vetting clearance for their roles. The force has now achieved this: there is no backlog of vetting health checks, aftercare and renewals.

An intranet page and a quarterly newsletter are the main channels for clarifying and reinforcing acceptable and unacceptable behaviours for the workforce. These also include details from misconduct cases. The professional standards department runs a learning and development forum that includes material from the [Independent Office for Police Conduct](#) (IOPC) and provides training to supervisors and probationers.

### Tackling corruption

The force has not yet completed its anti-corruption strategic assessment for 2019, but the standard of its current assessment is not good. It contains out-of-date information and does not include profiles of potentially corrupt officers or key locations for corrupt activity. The force’s local counter-corruption control strategy is also of a low standard. It does not include communication and engagement with the workforce and partners, including charities that work with vulnerable victims. It has not been widely shared in the force. However, the anti-corruption unit is making progress in implementing its measures.


The force does not use organisational information, such as email accounts and logs from crime reports, to proactively identify those people who are at risk of corruption. However, some are identified through its vetting and performance review process, and they are asked to attend an early intervention meeting. Following this, the officer is subject to further checks for a set time.

The anti-corruption unit is not staffed to a level where it can look for corruption. The force cannot yet fully monitor all its IT systems because the software has limited capability and is not compatible with all the force’s IT systems. This means the force must rely on audits of individual systems, which can be time-consuming.

In 2016, we made a national recommendation that all forces should form links with agencies that support vulnerable victims to look for information about police officers abusing their position for a sexual purpose. The force has not yet addressed this. Nor has it addressed the other elements of our 2016 recommendation regarding the capacity within the anti-corruption unit and its ability to monitor IT systems. Anti-corruption unit staff have worked with some external organisations, such as outreach workers and victim liaison. However, this work has not been followed up, which means that the force cannot reliably claim to have tackled this issue.

However, the force recognises the [abuse of position for a sexual purpose](#) as serious corruption, and this is reflected in its counter-corruption strategic threat assessment and control strategy. All the cases we reviewed had been appropriately referred to the IOPC. The force has given guidance and briefings to recruits, transferees and supervisors. It should do so for other officers and staff.

## Treating the workforce fairly



### Good

This question was not subject to detailed inspection in 2018/19, and our judgment from the 2017 legitimacy inspection has been carried over.

# Annex A – About the data

Data in this report is from a range of sources, including:

- Home Office;
- Office for National Statistics (ONS);
- our inspection fieldwork; and
- data we collected directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

When we collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they gave us, to make sure it was accurate. For instance:

- We shared the submitted data with forces, so they could review their own and other forces' data. This allowed them to analyse where data was notably different from other forces or internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors.

We set out the source of this report's data below.

## Methodology

### Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

When other forces were unable to supply data, we mention this under the relevant sections below.

### Population

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use ONS mid-2017 population estimates. This was the most recent data available at the time of inspection.

## **Survey of police staff**

We surveyed the police workforce across England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and how suitable their assigned tasks were. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample so the results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses per force varied between 32 and 365. So we treated results with caution and didn't use them to assess individual force performance. Instead, we identified themes that we could explore further during fieldwork.

## **BMG survey of public attitudes towards policing (2018)**

We commissioned BMG to survey public attitudes towards policing in 2018. Ipsos MORI conducted a similar version of the survey in 2015–2017.

The survey consisted of about 400 respondents for each of the 43 forces. Most surveys were completed online, by members of online research panels. However, a minority of the surveys (around 750) were conducted face-to-face. These face-to-face surveys were specifically targeted to groups that are traditionally under-represented on online panels. This aimed to make sure the survey respondents were as representative as possible of the total adult population of England and Wales. A small number of respondents were also surveyed online via postal invites to the survey.

Results were weighted by age, gender, ethnicity and indices of multiple deprivation to match population profiles. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, which may be more problematic for larger force areas compared to small ones. So any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

[The findings of this survey, and previous surveys, are available on our website.](#)

## **Review of crime files**

We reviewed police case files for these crime types:

- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding); and
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of how well the police:

- identify vulnerability;
- conduct investigations; and
- treat victims.

We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 January and 31 March 2018 and assessed them against several criteria. We reviewed 60 case files in each force, except for West Midlands Police and Greater Manchester Police where we reviewed 90.

For our file review, we only selected a small sample size of cases per force. So we didn't use results from as the only basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence.

## Force in context

### 999 calls

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

### Recorded crime and crime outcomes

We took this data from the December 2018 release of the Home Office [police recorded crime and outcomes data tables](#).

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (except fraud) recorded by all forces in England and Wales (except BTP). Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this inspection. So England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Police-recorded crime data should be treated with care. Recent increases may be due to forces' renewed focus on accurate crime recording since our 2014 national crime data inspection.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 30 September 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.
- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the HODH every month. All other forces provide this data via a monthly manual return.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. As part of the pilot, they stopped issuing simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and restricted their use of penalty notices for disorder for adult offenders. These three forces continued to follow these procedures since the pilot ended in November 2015. Later, other forces also limited their use of some out of court disposals. So the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.

For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see the Home Office statistics, [Crime outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2018](#).

## **Workforce figures (including ethnicity and gender)**

We took this data from the Home Office annual data return 502. The data is available from the Home Office's published [police workforce England and Wales statistics](#) or the [police workforce open data tables](#). The Home Office may have updated these figures since we obtained them for this report.

The data gives the full-time equivalent workforce figures as at 31 March. The figures include section 38-designated investigation, detention or escort officers, but not section 39-designated detention or escort staff. They include officers on career breaks and other types of long-term absence but exclude those seconded to other forces.

### **Spend per head of population**

We took this data from the [HMICFRS value for money profiles](#).

These profiles are based on data collected by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, through the Police Objective Analysis. The spend over time figures are adjusted for inflation. The population figures are ONS mid-year estimates, with the 2018/19 value calculated by assessing the trend for the last five years. [More details on this data can be found on our website](#).

### **Vetting data (workforce without up-to-date security clearance)**

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

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