Committees: Corporate Projects Board - f*or information* Streets and Walkways Sub-Committee *[for decision]* Projects Sub *[for decision]*	**Dates:** 02 February 2022 15 February 2022 17 February 2022
Subject: Bank on Safety **Unique Project Identifier:** *11599*	**Gateway 6: Outcome Report** Regular
Report of: Executive Director Environment **Choose an item.** **Report Author:** Gillian Howard	**For Decision**
PUBLIC	

Summary

1. Status update	**Project Description:** To improve safety and reduce casualties at Bank Junction ahead of the delivery of the longer-term project (All Change at Bank). **RAG Status:** Green (Amber at last report to Committee) **Risk Status:** Low (Medium at last report to committee) **Costed Risk Provision Utilised:** N/A; **Final Outturn Cost:** £1,782,571 The project was completed within the agreed budget, but was a little delayed compared to its original milestones.
2. Next steps and requested decisions	**Requested Decisions:** Members of Streets and Walkway's Committee and Projects Sub Committee are asked to: • Note the contents of this report • Approve the closure of the Bank on Safety Project with final staff costs to be confirmed and final account concluded.

	• Approve remaining funds to be returned to the On Street Parking Reserve (circa £39k)
3. Key conclusions	The Bank on Safety project was initiated as a shorter-term solution to focus on improving safety at the six-arm junction above Bank station, known as Bank Junction. Prior to 2016, there had been some serious road safety concerns in this location with two fatalities at the junction between 2012 and 2015 and a high number of serious casualties, specifically concerning the most vulnerable road users. A longer-term project was being developed (initiated in 2013) to simplify the junction and provide a better pedestrian environment. This was aligned with the time frame of the Bank Station Capacity upgrade completion which, at the time, was due to open in 2021. It was not possible to accelerate and deliver the needed safety improvement through this longer-term project which focuses on the simplification of the physical junction layout. The Bank on Safety Project instead focused on reducing the number of movements through the junction rather than the geometry of the junction. Using data to support the theory of the proposed restrictions, the experimental traffic scheme was implemented on 22 May 2017. This restricted movement through the junction and westbound on Cornhill to buses and cycles only, Monday to Friday 7am to 7pm. The experiment was in place for 16 months and data was collected and monitored with a comprehensive public consultation undertaken during this time. A final decision to make the experiment permanent was taken by the Court of Common Council on the 13 September 2018. As part of this approval, it was also recommended that some physical changes should take place to complement the traffic order restrictions whilst the longer-term scheme, All Change at Bank, was developed. A proposal to improve the performance of the restrictions in terms of compliance and behaviour, and provide some relief to pedestrian comfort levels, was further approved in July 2019. This included widening footways and crossings and reducing the number of traffic lanes into the junction. This construction work started in January 2020 and was completed at the end of August 2020 (following a short pause in construction during the COVID-19 national restrictions).

	The Bank on Safety experimental project had agreed success criteria which were: 1. A significant safety improvement at Bank. 2. Maintain access for deliveries. 3. Improve air quality at Bank. 4. Not unreasonably impact on traffic flow, whilst preferably improving bus journey times. These outlined success criteria were subject to several reports between May 2017 and September 2018 when the decision to keep the experiment was made. Officers' recommendation to make the scheme permanent were based on the data collected which demonstrated that the scheme was meeting its objectives/success criteria. There was a maximum of 18 months for the experiment to conclude, which limited the amount of available data on certain aspects. However, the key success criteria of improved safety has continued to be monitored as has air quality as these link into the longer term All Change at Bank project. They are revisited within this G6 report. Updates are not available for the criteria for '*Maintain access for deliveries*' as this was a specific piece of work undertaken for the scheme monitoring during the experiment and is not expected to have changed within the longer time frame. Also, the criteria of '*not unreasonably impacting on traffic flow'* has not been updated as it is very difficult to 'unpick' the impact of the Bank on Safety changes with the large number of utility works that were subsequently undertaken on the surrounding highway network, some of which required the reopening of Bank in certain directions to facilitate vehicle movement, and the impacts of the pandemic on travel patterns.

Main Report

Design & Delivery Review

4. Design into delivery	**The experiment:** 1. In terms of the main traffic restrictions, the design focussed on balancing the needs of businesses in the local area with achieving the reduced movement through the junction. The design of the restrictions were developed after engagement with businesses about their requirements and included retaining eastbound movement along Cornhill. This provided vehicles with as much access as possible close to the junction, but without crossing the junction. 2. It was challenging to find suitable locations further away from the junction to provide the directional signs which indicated to drivers to avoid Bank junction. These needed to be located ahead of decision points for drivers to take alternative routes. These directional signs sometimes required larger foundation depths due to the size of the sign plate. However, it proved difficult in some locations to situate the sign in the most advantageous place as there were limited depths available for these foundations. This meant that some compromises had to be made at some locations of the directional signs, sometimes a little further in advance of the decision point than would have been ideal. However, a substantial amount of directional signage was provided at several decision points along a route towards Bank, giving drivers as many opportunities to divert as possible. <u>Understanding the signs</u> 3. We received a number of comments relating to the design of the enforcement signage and it not being easy to understand. The sign used is the blue roundel with a bus and cycle on indicating which vehicles are permitted. The design team worked within the guidance set by the Department for Transport in the Traffic Signs Regulations Guidance and Directions 2016. 4. Members of the public felt that a red roundel, such as a no entry sign, would be more appropriate. However, no entry signs are not permitted for a timed restriction. An informal approach to the DfT confirmed that a formal application to have the no entry sign used on a timed restriction was unlikely to be successful. 5. Following several external reviews of the signage by consultants, no alternative sign face was recommended. Despite some people feeling that the signage was not well understood,

compliance levels were high relative to the numbers of vehicles that previously used the junction in the restricted hours, and stabilised at around 96% compliance during the experiment.

Pavement widening:

6. In September 2018, it was also decided that a temporary intervention to improve performance of the restrictions, both from a compliance and behaviour perspective should be introduced following comments made through the consutaltion and engagement of the project. The design taken forward increased the amount of pavement space available for people walking, reduced the number of traffic lanes into the main junction, and increased the length of the cycle advance stop lines. This was felt to be necessary whilst the longer-term Project (All Change at Bank) was restarted and investigations into more fundamental changes to the junction were investigated.

7. The work looked to resolve issues identified in the monitoring and consultation of the experimental order. These included;
    - Reducing pedestrian and cycle conflict.
    - Improve current pedestrian comfort levels.
    - Improve pedestrian and cycle compliance and behaviour at pedestrian crossing points and throughout the junction.
    - Improve compliance with the traffic restriction; and
    - Investigate options to increase the amount of disabled parking within the Bank Monitoring Area.

8. The temporary widening was designed to help the most congested areas of the junction, and to help improve sight lines for all people using the junction. This in turn should reduce the risk of conflict between people walking and cycling. Wider pavements also provide greater comfort and provide the opportunity for greater compliance with traffic signals by providing space for people walking to wait for the pedestrian phase of the traffic lights.

9. To deliver a change relatively quickly at a lower cost, but still delivering suitable change, a design for a semi-permanent scheme was proposed. These changes were anticipated to be removed within two-three years for the All Change at Bank Project.

10. This new approach used kerbs that effectively ‘stick down’ with pavements laid to the original kerb line, but essentially on top of the existing carriageway. The pavement extension was delivered using concrete slabs rather than yorkstone. This move away from the standard materials was agreed, and the result,

	due to how well the material was laid by the contractor, did not look out of place as had been feared. As can be seen in the images in Appendix 3 there is a visual difference between the materials but the choice of the size of the slab and the colouring worked well with the existing paving. 11. Alongside the pavement widening it was necessary to relocate the traffic signals closer to the new kerb lines. We also took the opportunity to widen the crossing areas for people waiting to cross at the same time for the same cost. 12. For this element of work, there was a lot of liaison with TfL in the preparation of the design and input from engineers from TfL who had previously worked at Bank on the junction traffic signal modification in 2013. This was invaluable to the design due to the very constrained site conditions. This helped to design out issues for the ducting for the traffic signals to be moved. It has also helped feed into the longer-term design for All Change at Bank. 13. The temporary design catered for diversion routes (accommodating the lengthy gas repair works by Cadent that closed Cannon St) and processional ceremonial routes such as the Lord Mayor's Show. Construction work of the design started in January 2020 and in March/April 2020 was paused because for the national restrictions relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. This extended the completion time from July 2020 to September 2020. 14. Once construction resumed, the contractors were able to deliver the design more quickly than they would have been able under normal circumstances. With significantly fewer people moving through the space as people were working from home, the need to operate around the peak flows dissipated and allowed for a steadier work pace throughout the day.
5. Options appraisal	15. The experimental design achieved what it set out to do. The principles of the design were reducing vehicle movements during the busiest period of people movement at the junction to reduce the risk of a collision. This has been proven to have worked. 16. In addition, because of the iterative process of an experimental scheme, further changes were recommended to improve the result. These subsequent physical changes have not had sufficient time in place for us to see the monitoring results of any further changes in casualty numbers. In addition, the pandemic has significantly reduced the numbers of people passing through

	the junction making before and after comparisons difficult, particularly regarding behaviour and compliance patterns. However, the increased pavement widths did improve pedestrian comfort levels in the most congested parts of the junction.
6. Procurement route	17. The Highways Term contractor was used for all physical delivery, assisted by TfL signals term contractor when moving their assets. The term contractor performed well and was responsive to changes in circumstances, particularly regarding the pandemic. 18. There were several smaller consultancy commissions which followed standard procurement procedures. 19. There was also a larger tender exercise regarding the lease of the enforcement traffic cameras for the experimental period. This was facilitated by procurement and with IT.
7. Skills base	20. A core project team was established and worked closely with a number of TfL officers to ensure the technical work for approvals was progressed in the best way. Following approval to start the experiment the project team expanded and the partnership work with the TfL officers intensified. 21. The project team expanded as the experiment progressed pulling in specialist skills as required. A project manager with data experience was employed who worked with Transport for London to determine a monitoring strategy to measure against the agreed success criteria. They were able to agree the sources of data required and set out how it was to be accessed. 22. Subsequently a data analyst was contracted to process this data appropriately. This was the first time a project had acquired so much data and required this level of data analysis. This consultant had a specific skill set which has benefited the wider team, as he then worked on projects to help build on the evidence led approach to changes of the street network. The data analyst was able to show data in a much more digestible format for the project team, the public and Members, which helped to form further recommendations. 23. There was a big focus on communications for the experiment and a specific role within the project team managing the incoming and outgoing communications ensuring that responses were sent, partner organisations updated, information distributed, and social media monitored etc. It also included all

	the hard copy information distributed and publicity on street such as banners and information towers. This role was created for the Aldgate project, and the benefits of having a central point that communications came into, and managed by, was shown to be beneficial. 24. Everyone on the project team had good communication skills and were able to deal with a variety of stakeholders, escalating as appropriate to more senior officers in accordance with the Communication Strategy. And each member of the project team had their own strengths which complemented the broad skill requirement. 25. Other than the technical traffic modelling work undertaken by a consultant (Norman Rourke Pryme) and the data analysis, most of the work for the experiment in terms of design and delivery was undertaken by inhouse staff. The Highways Engineer for Bank on Safety provided a high level of attention to detail and gained a lot of knowledge about how the junction operates and what its constraints are. This engineer has been retained for the All Change at Bank project and this knowledge and experience has been very important in the development of the proposed design. 26. There was also significant support from the Parking team including the Parking Ticket Office and the Enforcement contractor, Media team, Highways teams and all teams within City Transportation, particularly on the lead up to and first weeks of the experiment going live.
8 Stakeholders	27. The project had a communications strategy which was approved by the Director, which worked well in terms of setting out the messaging and how it would be delivered to the various stakeholders. 28. Alongside time spent by officers and members, there was invaluable time spent by the then Chairman of Planning and Transportation, meeting and responding to stakeholders on the lead up to the experiment and during its experimental period. Stakeholders were engaged with by all levels of the organisation and roles of communication were agreed and signed off within the communications strategy. Clear roles and responsibilities and messaging for different periods of the experiment were identified and how those messages were intended to be delivered. This gave a clear framework and assisted with trying to maintain control of the communications rather than always being in reactive mode

	29. Communication was vital to explain how the experiment procedures worked in addition to what the changes were and how individuals may be affected by these changes. Clear consistent messages also worked to counteract some of the negative social media commentary being provided by some stakeholders. 30. Stakeholders were communicated with by a wide range of methods including individual and group briefings, presentations, drop-in sessions, media articles, TV news interviews, website updates, leaflets handed out on street, letters, variable messaging signs and temporary signage. In addition, during the first days of the experiment being live, TfL also had information on their travel news (website) it was also broadcast on some radio stations travel news. 31. There were however significantly more communications (emails letters, telephone calls) with members of the public than had been anticipated which resulted in more staff resources being required. 32. With the pavement widening scheme in 2020, there was a smaller engagement plan and a smaller number of stakeholders.

Variation Review

9 Assessment of project against key milestones	33. The project was effectively initiated in December 2015 with an estimated 12-month programme to start the experiment. There was more traffic modelling to be completed and approved than had been appreciated in the December 2015 report, and so the Gateway 4/5 report was submitted in December 2016 seeking authority to proceed with the experiment. 34. In the December 2016 report it was anticipated that the experiment would be operational by the end of April 2017. The start of the experiment slipped to the 22 May 2017 to ensure that camera enforcement technology was operating and sufficient advertising and communications before the experiment started could take place. 35. The experiment conclusion report regarding the final recommendations to retain the experiment was received by committees in the summer of 2018 as anticipated, with final Court of Common Council approval in September 2018.

	36. With regards the second phase of making physical changes at the junction, the gateway 4/5 for this was approximately 6 months delayed due to the complex nature of the design requiring traffic signal location changes. This was instead received in June 2019. Construction was delayed from November 2019 until January 2020 following difficulties in getting the TfL traffic signal team programmed into the schedule. 37. The pandemic then interrupted construction, and final completion was obtained in September 2020 rather than June/July 2020.
10 Assessment of project against Scope	38. The experiment was a large and challenging project in many aspects. Costs did increase in comparison to initial estimates, and this was largely because the scale of the project, whilst simplistic in infrastructure, was complicated in terms of engagement and communications. It was difficult to explain how the traffic operations would be able to work as it was not intuitive. This was the benefit of undertaking this as an experimental traffic order as it gave the opportunity to show people how the scheme worked. 39. Additional work during the experiment was undertaken that had not been planned for. This work was requested to investigate whether there were options for taxis to be included in the operation of the junction. The experiment was agreed by members on the basis that taxis were not part of the permitted traffic, which had been tested for feasibility during the design and reported in the Gateway 5 report. The revisiting of this work complicated the communication of the experiment and raised expectation that under the existing experiment, which was already very challenging, that it would be possible to deliver alternative operations to be tested in the same 18 months. At the point in the experiment that this work was undertaken, and following legal advice, it was determined that such a change would not be possible within the existing experimental time period. 40. The main increased scope of the project happened once the traffic order was agreed to be made permanent. A second phase to the project to make some physical changes to the junction to better accommodate the numbers of pedestrians, reduce conflict between people walking and cycling and to enhance compliance was added. This was a further intermediate step to address concerns prior to the delivery of the All Change at Bank project.

11 Risks and issues	41. This project started prior to Costed Risk Provision being required. 42. There were 3 key outstanding risks identified at the gateway 5 report. these were: 1) Procurement of the ANPR cameras taking place within the time for the proposed operational date and having a testing period. 2) Ensuring that all the new traffic signal timing software is installed in time *3)* The negative reaction of drivers who are no longer permitted to cross the junction 43. The risk that required most attention was risk number 3. There was a more extensive response from taxi drivers to this experiment than had originally been envisaged. This required greater officer time in responding to drivers' questions and queries, liaison with the trade representatives and responding to subsequent Member enquiries who had been approached directly by drivers or trade representatives. 44. Risk 1 materialised in that we delayed the start of the experiment by a few weeks to ensure testing had taken place.
12 Transition to BAU	45. In making the experiment a permanent feature, the business-as-usual operations were already working well in terms of enforcement operations and there was little to transfer. 46. However, at the start of the experiment there was a steep learning curve regarding enforcement, and the volume of information that was being received and needed to be processed. There were some difficulties in the first weeks of the experiment in being able to keep up with the volume of warning letters and early Penalty Charge Notices (PCN's). However, as the scheme settled in, and the balance of staff resources was identified things started to work more smoothly. Lessons were learned from this and transferred for the Beech Street experiment.

Value Review

13 Budget	Project was initiated before Costed Risk provision was a requirement.

Estimated Outturn Cost (G2)	Estimated cost: £500,000

	At Authority to Start work (G5)	Final Outturn Cost
Fees	£317,300	£429,845
Staff Costs	£573,800	£974,703
Works	£288,000	£378,024
Purchases	£0	£0
Other Capital Expend	£0	£0
Costed Risk Provision	£0	£0
Recharges	£0	£0
Other*	£0	£0
Total	£1,179,100	£1,782,571

47. The second phase of the project to widen the pavements around the main junction was not part of the original Gateway 5 report in December 2016 (used above). This work was estimated to cost £434,716 for design and implementation and spent approximately £400,000 This is included in the above final outturn cost.

48. There is a balance on the account which predominately relates to the 'Works'. The additional improvements relating to signage and delineation of the pedestrian crossing areas were not undertaken following completion of the main pavement widening works. This was due to the continuing pandemic restrictions reducing the numbers of people moving through the area and the development of the longer-term project, All Change at Bank, now anticipated to start construction in April this year. These additions would have been altered as part of the construction of the All Change at Bank project and so there was thought to be too short a time to get reasonable value out of the implementation of these.

49. There was an approximate increase of the main experimental budget of 17% between the initial gateway 5 and the September 2018 experiment closure. The most significant increase was on staff costs. This was largely because the interest in the experiment was much greater than had been anticipated and required a greater number of staff resources to fulfil stakeholder expectations.

Please confirm whether or not the Final Account for this project has been verified.*

	No. (final staff costs to be run)
14 Investment	*N/A*
15 Assessment of project against SMART objectives	50. The following section looks at the elements that could be measured for a longer period after the experiment had been made permanent. **A significant safety improvement at Bank:** 51. There is a long lead in time for the verified casualty statistics. There are three full years of data since the year that the Bank on Safety scheme was implemented. However, one of these years is 2020 which was impacted by national Covid-19 restrictions. The data is verified to the end of 2020 and not likely to change. 52. However, a combination of national restrictions and changes to the local street network associated with the pandemic, resulted in a significant decrease in the number of people and vehicles at Bank. This is likely to have led to fewer casualties. Only two casualties were recorded at Bank Junction in 2020 (one during scheme operating hours). 53. In both 2018 and 2019 there were periods of time where Bank junction reopened to traffic on Queen Victoria Street to accommodate the emergency work at Monument and Cannon Street for the gas repair and its subsequent replacement. This meant that a greater number of vehicles were legitimately travelling through the junction during the scheme restriction times. 54. In the original gateway 4/5 for the experiment, it was estimated that casualty reduction of between 50 and 60% could be expected. It should be noted that there have not been any serious casualties recorded at Bank Junction during operating hours for two years (2019/2020) and no fatalities have been recorded since 2015. 55. Whilst recognising that the 2020 statistics are lower than they otherwise would have been with the pandemic, there is still a clear reduction in the total number of casualties in comparison to the years leading to the restriction (for casualties that occurred in scheme operating hours). This can be seen in Chart 1 below.

Chart 1



56. The area considered as Bank junction can be seen in Appendix 4. The three-year average of 2014 to the end of 2016 was 13.6 casualties per year (that occurred Monday to Friday 7am to 7pm). After the experiment the three-year average of 2018 to the end of 2020 is 6.3 casualties per year. This is a reduction in the average number of casualties of 47% between the three years pre and post scheme implementation year. However, there were only 2 casualties for the whole year at bank junction in 2020 which is unusual.

57. If you took the two-year average of 2018 to the end of 2019, of 8.5 casualties and compared to the pre-scheme three-year average, that would be a reduction of 37.5% in the number of casualties. The minimum success criteria was 25%.

Improve Air Quality at Bank

58. In appendix 2, table 1 shows the annual average NO_2 for each diffusion tube monitored by the Bank project.

59. Chart 2 below is showing the data for clusters of these tubes and showing the combined annual average of NO_2 within that area. The map in appendix 2 shows the three areas, for the Bank junction, the middle (or bank monitoring area) and then the outer (or wider) monitoring area.

Chart 2



60. As can be seen in the graph and the data in appendix 2, there has been an improvement in air quality regarding NO_2 within all three areas (on average) with Bank Junction still having higher average NO_2 levels than the streets near to Bank (Middle).

61. 2020 data shows a clear decline in the amount of NO_2 across the City with the national restrictions in place and is the only time that NO_2 on average across these three areas decreased to under the World Health Organisation's Maximum average guideline for NO_2 (This was the guideline at the time and has since been updated in 2021 to a maximum of 10 µg m-3). Out of the 23 sites that are monitored, in 2019 only one of them measured an annual average of NO_2 below 40 µg m-3, which was on Lothbury.

62. There have been many other interventions such as the ULEZ and the National Restrictions for COVID that look as though they have made significant differences to the levels of NO_2. What is shown is that based on the annual averages for each location, there has been a decrease in the levels of NO_2, This suggests that the Bank

	on Safety restrictions did not make air quality worse in the surrounding area. 63. The detailed success criteria for this element were "to see a measured reduction at Bank and not to make the wider monitoring area worse overall". This has been achieved. **Not unreasonably impact on traffic flow, whilst preferably improving bus journey times.** 64. Following the experiment, significant disruption to travel patterns during 2018 and 2019 was experienced, including the emergency gas repairs and subsequent replacement in Cannon Street which required the reopening of the Queen Victoria Street arm into Bank junction for general traffic until mid-November 2019. 65. Following this, the impact of the Pandemic during 2020 on the change of travel patterns and subsequent changes to the way traffic moves in the City, there is not a significant period to monitor that can give a true reflection of the changes that could be directly associated with the traffic restrictions. With the anticipated All Change at Bank scheme set to change the way traffic moves in the area again, this will continue to be an area that is kept under review. **Providing wider pavements:** 66. The second part of this project, the delivery of wider footways, set out to improve several areas of concern which had been raised through the public consultation and monitoring of the traffic restrictions. These were to: a. Reduce pedestrian and cycle conflict. b. Improve current pedestrian comfort levels. c. Improve pedestrian and cycle compliance and behaviour at pedestrian crossing points and throughout the junction. d. Improve compliance with the traffic restriction; and e. Investigate options to increase the amount of disabled parking within the Bank Monitoring Area. 67. The first four points were planned to be improved by the footway and crossing widening design. 68. The last point regarding increasing disabled parking, three spaces were identified in the monitoring area, advertised, and installed. One bay in Pancras Lane and two bays in George Yard. With the two bays that were moved from Bartholomew Lane to Cornhill as

	part of the experiment, this gives an increase of two bays in the local area. 69. Similarly, to some of the other monitoring criteria, the ability to objectively critique the success or not of the footway widening has been impacted by the pandemic, with the numbers of people walking in the area not returning to pre pandemic levels to be able to compare. 70. Observationally, the additional pavement is providing more comfortable space for people walking to socially distance. The original footprint of the junction would have struggled to offer adequate pavement space for bidirectional movement and social distancing. 71. Officers' observations in terms of compliance of crossing movements is that generally people walking are remaining on the pavement and not needing to step into the carriageway to overtake slower moving people. However due to the reduced numbers of people crossing the junction in a vehicle (including cyclists) in comparison to pre pandemic numbers, many people walking are not waiting for the pedestrian phase of the traffic signals before crossing. This means that it looks as though pedestrian compliance of the traffic signal authority has reduced. 72. Observationally, the quieter streets have also increased the percentage of people cycling proceeding through red lights into the junction. This is likely to be a combination of quieter surroundings, better sight lines meaning that they can see there are no vehicles, and fewer people walking in the area crossing the carriageway (formally or informally). It is expected that this a temporary situation until traffic volumes rise again. 73. Since the scheme was completed in September 2020, the provisional casualty recordings at Bank Junction (to end of August 2021) have indicated one pedestrian and cycle collision out of a total of six collisions. These are provisional and there maybe self-reported incidents not yet included. All six collisions happened between May and August 2021, five of which occurred during the Monday to Friday 7am to 7pm restrictions. They have all happened in different locations across the junction area. With a limited amount of information there is no conclusion that can be drawn from this data. With fluctuating national restrictions, it is impossible to distinguish the impacts of the changes vs the impacts of people returning to work unfamiliar with the area after a long period away.

16 Key benefits realised	74. The key benefits have been realised which was to see a significant safety improvement at the junction in advance of the longer-term project linked with the Bank Station Capacity upgrade.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

17 Positive reflections	**Implementation of the experiment:** TfL 75. Initially there were some difficulties with getting buy in from TfL to work with us on developing the experiment. However, as the technical work started to show that there was the opportunity for improved safety, bus journey time savings and minimal disruption to the surrounding network, the working relationship improved. As we moved into the implementation phase of the experiment, the partnership with TfL was very strong, officers working well together with a common purpose. This partnership was recognised at the London Transport awards in 2018, as the transport team/partnership of the year. 76. A large component of the implementation of the experiment was the changes to traffic signal timings at approximately 25 surrounding junctions. During the initial start of the experiment there was a very structured feedback system in place to ensure that the network was operating as efficiently as it could. Officers from the City were invited to sit within the TFL control room to ensure rapid communications in the event of an issue in the first days of the experiment. Communications 77. There were little physical works required for the experiment, but a significant part of the implementation was ensuring that people knew about the restrictions. TV news coverage, radio, newspapers (local and national) covered stories on the experiment. There was also good use of Variable Messaging signs on street in advance of the experiment becoming live, giving advance warning to drivers of the changes coming. There was a good working relationship internally with the press office team, and regular updates provided to ensure the key messages were being distributed at the right times. 78. Whilst the interest in the experiment was much greater than originally anticipated, the resource was put into providing information, briefings, presentations etc to stakeholders, and this developed a wider network of communication cascade. The experience of this has fed into other City Transportation projects and the relationships made during this time maintained where possible. However, this is difficult to maintain as individuals

move on and the relationships are broken, and there is not always a relevant project in the area to retain ongoing continuing communication.

Enforcement:

79. Whilst the planning, monitoring and communication of the experiment was largely undertaken by City Transportation, this was a large change for the parking enforcement teams to deal with. The Civil Enforcement Officers were briefed so they also spread the message that things were changing or had changed, by handing out leaflets to people in the local area explaining what was happening and giving drivers warning of the changes. They were the face-to-face daily contact with drivers and their hard work was appreciated.

80. The parking services team worked incredibly hard to keep up with the volume of work that was directed to them in both the number of PCN's that were issued, and the subsequent enquiries, challenges, and Freedom of Information requests. This experiment was a large change to the way that the team had operated, but the team responded positively and overcame the issues and developed and embedded new ways of working. They were able to respond to this change, and without their hard work the experiment may have failed if compliance had not been rigorously enforced.

Awards:

81. In addition to the London Transport Award for Transport Team/Partnership of the year in 2018, the scheme also won
    - Most Effective Road Safety, Traffic Management & Enforcement Projects 2019 at the London Transport awards; and
    - Highly Commended in the National Chartered Institute of Highways and Transportation awards in 2019 in the walking and cycling category.

Construction of the wider pavements

82. There has been a delay in getting the second additional part of the project developed and constructed. The influence of the pandemic had both negative and positive impacts during construction. The negative impact being that construction had to be paused for a time whilst new risk assessments and working practices were identified and implemented.

83. However, as the area was significantly quieter once construction resumed, the delivery team were able to speed up the

	construction delivery without the significant flows of people walking and moving through the area in the peaks. 84. The experimental construction methodology was also found to have worked well, with it being relatively easy to procure and install. Installation was less invasive because of the limited digging required. Bank has a natural gradient for drainage which in this instance helped the design needing few drainage changes to accommodate the new kerb lines. 85. The materials used are not part of the City's usual material pallet, but they have shown that they have their place in certain instances. The kerb material is relatively quick to lay and for a scheme intended to have a limited life offers a quick and cost-effective change. The concrete pavers can be reused or crushed and reused as hard core. 86. Prior to construction taking place, Traffic Management Orders were applied for that were broad enough in their requests to accommodate multiple roads (which was key at Bank as its where six streets meet). This approach then allowed flexibility in the construction programme, mitigating the risk of delay. 87. The experience of delivering an interim improvement to provide changes for people whilst longer term transformation is planned, has helped to inform the approach to the Pedestrian Prioirty Phase 1 projects. It will also inform future projects where interim changes are appropriate. **overall** 88. The experience has also demonstrated the advantage of undertaking complex projects in an iterative manner. It allows for proposed traffic movement changes to be tested and proven first at relatively low cost, compared to trying to move a complex project through detailed design all at once. The iterative approach can also help with taking the community with the project, giving them the experience of the traffic movement changes and give them a view of what that might then mean for the ability to transform a space. 89. The City is seen as an exemplar in this approach, and have shared information with other London boroughs of things that have worked well and things that did not work so well.
18 Improvement reflections	**The experiment:** 90. This project required an enormous amount of work which has provided many lessons. We had not tried to do something of this

	scale before as an experiment and there was a lack of knowledge in the beginning about the level of detail this would entail and the intricacies of the regulations. The team is more aware of some of the pitfalls and benefits of undertaking experimental traffic orders and lessons surrounding the required resource to manage large scale experiments are much more understood. **Construction of wider pavements** 91. There were some issues with the design and installation of the traffic signals and the coordination of this element between the City and TfL. Earlier engagement would have been useful due to the junction's complex nature. This lesson has been taken forward into the All Change at Bank project where an engineer was allocated to the project by TfL during the main detailed design phase of the project. 92. On a more technical note, quite late into the construction planning, TfL stated they required a specific type of temporary traffic signal for when the main signals were out of action for a period. These temporary signals were able to be adjusted remotely if needed to be reactive to the network requirements. On its own this requirement was reasonable. However there appeared to be only one supplier which we had not worked with before, and the system cost more than had been budgeted for. 93. In addition, communication of requirements for installation of this equipment was poor and resulted in a requirement for a full closure of the junction, which had not been identified earlier in the planning process. This was an area that caused significant frustration. Ideally this system would not be used again, avoiding the installation issues that were identified, but this may be difficult to avoid depending upon the location. What is recommended is early engagement and specific questioning of installation processes and who is responsible for which elements to avoid short notice closures. 94. The scale of the experimental order meant that the ability to be flexible was diminished once live. The order could be tweaked and was in terms of the loading and waiting provision, but the main restrictions were difficult to be flexible with. This was an area that hadn't been fully appreciated during design. Officers had focused on the flexibility of removing the restrictions if they were not working as expected. However, when the scheme was showing positive signs of operating well, some of the stakeholder focus changed to trying to modify the restrictions, such as to

	include taxis. There was not the flexibility to do this. Moving forward with future experiments, Officers have a better appreciation and understanding of how experimental traffic orders work, what additional work might be required prior to the start of an experiment to be better prepared for changes and modifications to be made later, and equally to be clearer of what cannot be achieved. 95. In addition, whilst we liaised early with our internal legal team, we also had to seek additional support from Counsel. In future, for something of this scale, earlier engagement with Counsel in the process could be undertaken to look at mitigating risks and having a greater legal understanding of any possible options for changing the experiment. This would be an upfront cost but could reduce officer time later with a clearer understanding of our options. 96. There was a lot of interest in the experiment from Members, and therefore there were regular reports produced. The usual hierarchy of reporting for this project was extended to include Policy and Resources and the Court of Common Council. This showed robust scrutiny of the proposals. However, it did mean that the time period for decision making was elongated. For future schemes, there may be greater opportunity to utilise delegations more effectively where appropriate.
19 Sharing best practice	97. Information has been shared with teams across City Transportation and Highways and already incorporated into other projects, including the All Change at Bank project. 98. Lessons have also been shared externally with presentations at conferences and workshops on the experiment.
20 AOB	no other points to note

Appendices

Appendix 1	Project Coversheet
Appendix 2	Air Quality information
Appendix 3	Before and After photos.
Appendix 4	Bank junction area for casualties
Appendix 5	Finance tables

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