

National Lead Force Performance Report

Q2: July – September 2023



Performance Assessment

The dashboard provides an assessment of City of London Police (CoLP) performance against the National Lead Force (NLF) aims and objectives as set out in the National Lead Force Plan 2020-2023 (NLF Plan). The NLF Plan was approved by the City of London Police Authority in October 2020. The Plan sets out how CoLP will improve the national response to fraud. It reflects NLF's contribution and commitment to the National Fraud Policing Strategy and the National Economic Crime Centre's (NECC) five-year strategy. The NECC leads the 'whole system' effort to drive down growth in fraud on behalf of the UK Government.

The NLF plan sets out five outcomes that City of London Police is seeking to achieve: -

			ζ.	ζ
Outcome 1	Supporting and safeguarding victims	We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.		
Outcome 2	Disrupt fraudsters	We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.		†
Outcome 3	Investigate and prosecute	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		→
Outcome 4	Raise awareness and prevent crime We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.			→
Outcome 5	Building As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capabilities capabilities to tackle fraud across policing and the wider system.		→	→



The grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria



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Executive Summary

	Outcome 1		Outcome 2		Outcome 3		Outcome 4		Outcome 5	
s	Supporting and safeguarding victims		Disrupt fraudsters		Investigate and prosecute		Raise awareness and prevent crime		Building capabilities	
B C	Higher levels of NECVCU repeat victims in Q2. Victim survey results from Q2 show 80% increase in confidence and will act as a benchmark in Q3 Consistent escalations. 100% Vulnerable Person Alerts sent in 7 days. 37% highly likely reports reviewed in 28 days, with disseminations increasing. 100% victim updates sent. 98% cyber reports disseminated by the target 7 days. 92% of live cyber incidents	A. B. C.	against OCGs were below the 22/23 average. Total disruptions against OCGs and SOC strategic vulnerabilities surpassed both Q2 22/23 and the quarterly average. Proportionally, Q2 saw a slight drop in the number of Major disruptions to OCGs, and an increase in Moderates. The number and value of POCA activities decreased from Q1. Disruptions against cyber enablers rose from Q1	A. B. C.	Q1 to Q2 but were still below the 22/23 average. All 45 forces remained compliant in reporting their outcomes.	В. С.	The number of social media posts was lower than Q1, but higher than any quarter in 22/23 with a range of messaging across all teams. The related impressions fell due to removal of Facebook bot accounts. A successful courier fraud intensification was supported, working in London with the SWROCU. An Action Fraud campaign focused on student safety reached 6.1 million	A. В. С.	decreased both across number of courses and number of delegates trained due to the school holidays. ECCA satisfaction rose to the highest it's been for the last two years. NLF demonstrated a wide range of collaborations in Q2. A project between PIPCU and the UK Border Force is highlighted. PECT teams staffing moved closer to the end of year target, and	
K L.	responded to in 2 hours due to 3 exceptions. 95% Protect advice sent in 72 hrs Number of Recall alerts sent peaked in August.		22/23, particularly driven by disruptions to bank accounts.				people and they saw their best ever performing social media post.		positive results in the period.	




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
NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.


Success Measures:

- A. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud telephone reporting service.
- B. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud online reporting service.









Telephone Reporting Service – The Action Fraud confirmation survey looks at call handler knowledge, victim satisfaction with the service provided and the speed of answer. Feedback to this survey in Q2 indicates that satisfaction remains stable and within target at 96.3%, representing a slight improvement on Q1 (95.5%), and on Q2 of 2022/23 (95.8%). Overall satisfaction levels in this area remain high over the long term.

The significant staffing uplift in Q1 continues to impact performance, with a reduction in call abandonment to 28% from 33% in the previous quarter. The service maintained an establishment above target despite a drop in September, thanks to the summer recruitment drive, and ongoing biweekly classes. As a result of enhanced processes to ensure improved quality and accuracy in recording, call handling times increased by 1% in Q2 with an average of 22 minutes. The average speed of answer reduced by 30% in Q2 at 6.22 minutes and the average speed to abandonment reduced by 24% to 4.53 minutes.

In order to provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the telephone reporting service, Action Fraud have implemented several improvements to enhance the user journey and accessibility into the service, such as Language Line and the Sign Video reporting option for Deaf users. Since the launch of the Advisor XP Contact Centre tool in Q1 there has been an improvement in the volume and quality of advice and referrals provided to victims, and a reduction in call waiting times.

Victim feedback indicates that Action Fraud advisors have provided a consistently good service since the launch of the current satisfaction survey in October 2018. Over 1.9m links to this survey have been delivered, with over 21.2k respondents (1.1%) opting to provide satisfaction feedback including free text responses, which are used to continuously improve the service. Overall, 1.1% of those reporting a crime in Q2 opted to provide satisfaction feedback.

Online Reporting Service – In Q2, satisfaction rose from 82% in Q1 to 83%, with a peak in September of 87%.

Action Fraud are unable to make any changes to the current website, however a new reporting tool is in development and will launch early next year. It is anticipated that this will bring online satisfaction in line with the telephone service. In the short term, facilities such as webchat and chat bot have improved satisfaction through the provision of support and guidance, assisting the victim through the self-reporting process. This increases the capacity of advisors, enabling them to answer more calls and give more time to supporting vulnerable callers.

NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.


Success Measures:

- C. To reduce the level of repeat victimisation after NECVCU contact.
- D. To ensure victims feel safer and more confident after NECVCU contact, with reduced emotional harm and improved sense of safety.
- E. To improve consistency of victim support across all police forces.



The National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (NECVCU) supports forces at a local level, delivering care to victims of fraud and cyber-crime, allowing for a consistent and national standard of care and support.


The **Level 1** service gives Protect/Prevent advice to non-vulnerable victims of fraud. The **Level 2** service engages with victims when vulnerability is identified, and by giving crime prevention advice and signposting to local support services helps the victim to cope and recover from the fraud.




Repeat Victims – The definition of a repeat victim is "a second or subsequent report by a victim of fraud who has had previous contact with NECVCU within a rolling 12-month period". During the period there were 21 repeat victims identified, down from the 2022/23 quarterly average of 26 but up from 6 in Q1. In Q2 both services engaged with a total of 15,840 victims, meaning the 21 repeat victims represent 0.13% of victim contacts.

Victims feel safer – A victim survey has been launched, measuring whether victims feel safer and more confident after contact with an Advocate. Early results from Q2 show 80% are more confident and 70% feel safer. Response levels to the survey have been low but are expected to rise as the process is embedded.

Consistent Support – The NECVCU now supports **43** forces in England and Wales at level 1 and following a significant staff uplift in May, provides **36** forces with an additional service at level 2 (formerly 6 forces), with talks to onboard more in the future. Escalations to provide additional service(s) to support vulnerable victims following interaction with NECVCU have risen during the period. This is likely the result of more police forces being supported from different points during the period.







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
Success Measures:

- F. To review and, where appropriate, disseminate vulnerable person alert within 7 days.
- G. To review and respond to all allegations of fraud that meet 'highly likely' or 'likely vulnerable' on the solvability matrix, within 28 days.
- H. To provide an NFIB outcome to all victims, within 28 days.




Vulnerable Person Alerts – To identify potentially vulnerable victims, searches are run on all reports of fraud, looking for under 18s, and agreed 'risky words' which highlight a vulnerability risk for the victim – such as suicide, mental health, or threats to life.

In Q2, the search found 2,812 reports came from vulnerable victims and 100% of alerts were sent within the target of 72 hours. August reported a high of 1,185 vulnerable victims identified, and 100% of the related alerts were sent in 72 hours demonstrating the priority placed on victim care.



Priority Allegations – The process for prioritising which reports to review was developed in 2022. Rather than monetary thresholds, fraud reports are now assessed against a number of criteria to establish a 'solvability' score. Those 'highly likely' and 'likely' to be solved are prioritised for review.

During Q2, 37% of 'highly likely' and 17% of 'likely vulnerable' reports were reviewed within 28 days of reporting. During the quarter the overall volume of disseminations rose from 3,419 in July, to 10,501 in September.



Victim Contact regarding Outcomes

100% of fulfilment letters were dispatched to victims within 48 hours of the request being received.

The NFIB has multiple advice letters, tailored to each fraud type, which are emailed to victims on a weekly basis. This service is known as 'Send in Blue'. In August 2021, this process was automated, and the success rate went from a low of 59% in June to an average of 99.69% for the rest of 2021/22.

In Q2 23/24, the success rate of Send in Blue was also 100%.




NLF Role: We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

Success Measures:

- I. To review and disseminate all Action Fraud reports classified with an NFIB Cybercrime code, within 7 days of report creation.
- J. To respond to all live cybercrime reports, within 2 hours of reporting.
- K. All businesses reporting cyber enabled crime to receive Protect advice within 72 hours of receipt by the Protect Team.






Live Cyber Incidents – 43 live cyber incidents were recorded in Q2, and in July and August each one was reviewed, and a response sent within 2 hours. In September, performance fell to 75%.

This is due to three disseminations being delayed by issues such as technical problems or review by the NCA. The majority of reports are reviewed and disseminated in less than 60 minutes.



Cyber Reports – In Q2, 10,717 reports were classified with a Cybercrime code, up 37% (+2,869) from the previous quarter.

Of these, 100% were disseminated for Protect or Pursue activity, 98% within the target 7-day period. Performance improved from 97% to 99% throughout the quarter.



Protect Advice – NFIB Business Protect provided protect advice to 413 organisations during Q2, down 5% (-20) from the previous quarter. 95% (395) of organisations received the advice within 72 hours of reporting to Action Fraud. This measure seems to have recovered from delays caused by the high number of bank holidays within the previous reporting period.





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
Success Measures:

To help victims of fraud to prevent or recover losses through information sharing with the banking sector and support from victim care.



The **NLF Victim Care Unit** is a unique team, which acts as a conduit between NLF Fraud Ops Investigations and their victims of fraud. NLF VCU ensure that the Victims Code Of Practice is complied with and address the welfare needs of victims by triaging out to support services. They also play a part in the Protect strand of the 4P plan by proactively offering prevention advice to stop revictimization, also disrupting OCG activity.


NLF VCU have an ongoing partnership with TrueCall who install call blocking devices for victims who receive high volumes of fraudulent calls. Volumes were steady from Q1 to Q2 but remained below the 22/23 average due to units falling dormant. The team will attempt to issue further units during the quarter.




Project RECALL is an initiative for informing banks about fraudulent payments so they may consider acting against beneficiary accounts and repatriate victims' money. This quarter 2,999 account alerts were sent to banks, up 48% from Q1 (+976). The value of Q2 alerts also rose from £7,166,946 to £10,801,427 (+50%). This represents the highest volume of alerts since the inception of the Project, with August seeing 1,088 alerts.

The rise in both volume and value of Recall alerts is due to significant work by the NFIB to analyse data, hold meetings with participating banks and review processes with UK Finance. This work has helped to identify best practices within banks and create recommendations to improve the process moving forward. New relationships with additional financial institutions were established so that more alerts can be sent and acted upon.

The number of disrupted bank accounts has been rising since the inception of the project and the initiative allows not only for funds to be returned to victims but also disrupts fraudsters, demonstrates good partnership working, and provides CoLP with the ability to start an investigation early if an alert is missed by the banks.








Outcome 2: Disrupt Fraudsters.


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
Success Measures:

- A. To sustain the level of National Lead Force disruptions against Organised Crime Groups and Strategic Vulnerabilities.
- B. To increase the proportion of Major and Moderate disruptions.









There are currently 81 mapped **Organised Crime Groups (OCGs)** under investigation by National Lead Force teams. Five new OCGs were mapped in the quarter, and one was archived.

There were **18 disruptions** claimed against NLF OCGs in Q2, which is a 31% decrease compared to the 26 in Q1 and is just below the quarterly average from 2022/23. A Major disruption represents the OCG being fully dismantled or impacted at a key player level. There have been 4 major disruptions for Q2 with 2 more awaiting final sign-off, and 10 moderates. There were an additional 207 disruptions against Serious Organised Crime strategic vulnerabilities throughout the period.


Activity against OCGs is not consistent and depends on a number of factors, including resources, capacity, and criminal activity. It is worth noting that approximately 35 of the active operations are Tier 4 investigations, meaning they are **awaiting court results** and/or are in their final stages before being archived. This means no further operational activity is planned against them and the only disruption left to claim is a Major once sentences are delivered. There have been many adjourned NLF cases in the last year, mostly due to Covid backlogs and barrister strikes.

Notable Major Disruptions

The first of two major disruptions by **Fraud Operations** concerned a fictional cryptocurrency and fraudulent company. From 2015 to 2017, £509,599 was deposited into the company, exploiting the allure of the emerging cryptocurrency market. During the trial, evidence showed that the defendants made no attempt to reinvest the funds. The defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud and sentenced to over 6 years each.

Fraud Ops recorded a second major disruption when a defendant was jailed for 6 years on counts of conspiracy to defraud and fraud by false representation after faking signatures on fraudulent invoices. The total value of the 29 invoices was £669k and a further 8 invoices were stopped before payment.

Following collaborative work between **PIPCU**, Kent Police and Apple investigators, a Dutch national was jailed for his part in a Europe-wide scam that involved exchanging counterfeit Apple products under warranty for genuine replacements, amounting to over £6,500.




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
NLF Role: We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

Success Measures:

C. To increase the use of POCA powers to freeze, restrain and protect proceeds of crime.









Notable POCA Activities

DCPCU investigated a report of mandate fraud in which a London hotel was impersonated resulting in a loss of over £870,000. Through passive data, communications data, intelligence and money laundering enquiries DCPCU identified a suspect in the fraud. In September they were arrested, charged and remanded in custody where they currently await trial. Through financial investigation DCPCU have been able to recover over £500,000 of these fraud losses to date.


In an **IFED** case a court granted a confiscation order against a man who was jailed in 2021 after he cloned a claims management company and orchestrated over 60 fraudulent motor insurance claims. The defendant was given 3 months to pay £210,000 and failure to pay will result in him facing an additional 5 years imprisonment.

The **Asset Recovery Team** secured a compensation order of £111,304 for a **Fraud Ops** investigation. the defendant was convicted of one count of Fraud which related to the defrauding of his employers during the period of July 2015 and May 2021 whereby he made 147 transactions from a company account to his own that amounted to £207,602.46.

In August the courts authorised a restraint of £186,182 in a **PIPCU** case that is going through court for confiscation. The suspect was found guilty of selling counterfeit IBTV set-top boxes.

Use of POCA Powers

In Q2, Operational Fraud teams and Funded Units carried out 13 POCA activities. This is below the 2022/23 quarterly average of 15 and the Q1 total of 23. Most of the activity focused on confiscations (7) and asset restraining orders (5). The greatest value came in August, driven by a cash detention by DCPCU totalling £477,287. Additionally, the teams worked to ensure that Courts awarded 7 victims £382,218 compensation.






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
NLF Role: We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.

Success Measures:

D. To increase the identification and disruption of cyber enablers to curtail criminality and protect victims.










Notable Disruptions

DCPCU saw high numbers of bank account disruptions due to the execution of search warrants regarding individuals suspected of sending fake text messages, or smishing. The suspects are thought to have sent messages purporting to be from the child of the victim, claiming that they lost, broke or damaged their phone and are in need of money. If the victim replied to the smishing message they would receive a further direct SMS message with bank details and a request to send urgent payment. Following the search warrants, DCPCU arrested 3 individuals on suspicion of conducting the smishing offences and seized multiple SIM farms belonging to the suspects as well as their devices, on which evidence of offending has been uncovered. A further 5 suspects have been identified through analysis of devices.

NFIB's Prevention and Disruption team (P&D) have had success in removing 34 websites and email addresses created to facilitate online shopping fraud, by suspects believed to be residing in China. Although individual losses to victims are low the overall value is large. This particular group of suspects have been targeted a number of times as P&D continue to disrupt their efforts to defraud the public. A prominent travel company fell victim to mandate fraud after receiving invoices for payment of over £250,000 to one of their suppliers. The supplier's email had been cloned and P&D had the suspect domains closed, removing the opportunity to commit further fraud. A referral from the Fraud Review Team regarding a website linked to a sophisticated investment fraud resulted in the disruption of the original website and 14 further linked entities intended to further target victims. Their removal was key to protecting the public from further harm.

During Q2, a total of 11,919 disruptions to technological enablers were recorded, higher than the Q1 total of 9,248. This rise in disruptions was driven by a spike in bank account disruptions by DCPCU, which offset a fall in website take downs.

Volumes of disruptions fluctuate throughout the year according to operational priorities, opportunities and intensifications.







Outcome 3: Investigate and Prosecute.

NLF Role: We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

Success Measures:

- A. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded nationally by Policing.
- B. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded by City of London Police.
- C. To maintain the level of Home Office forces in the compliant category for reporting at 100%.





The total outcomes reported in a period can relate to disseminations from any time frame. The volume of outcomes is expected to fluctuate throughout the year as cases with varying numbers of crimes attached are seen in courts. For example, one investigation into a boiler room might have hundreds of outcomes attached to it and closing the case will give many outcomes, potentially bringing closure to multiple victims.

Note: Judicial outcomes refer to Home Office Counting Rules Outcomes 1-8 which include charges, cautions, taken into consideration etc. (they do not refer to the wider criminal justice process).

FY 23/24 FYTD	No. Forces		
Compliant (4-6 Returns)	45		
Partially Compliant (3 Returns)	0		
Non Compliant (0-2 Returns)	0		

Forces are required to provide outcome information to CoLP every month, matched against their NFIB disseminations. In Q2, all forces provided their return each month. The National Coordinators Office (NCO) continue to engage with forces to ensure compliance is maintained.

Nationally, Q2 2023/24 continued to yield increasing volumes of Judicial outcomes, an increase of 3% (52) on Q1 and a year-to-date increase of 2% (50) to 3,176, when compared to the prior year comparative period (2021/22). Essex had a strong Q2 performance with an investment fraud yielding 105 Judicial Outcomes. The National Force Intelligence Bureau has recently implemented a new process for Serious and Organised crime operation monitoring. This improves dissemination of linked crimes to existing operations and consequently the recording of outcomes for those investigations.

CoLP Judicial outcomes are up from Q1 to Q2 by 16 (80%) and in line with the Q2-Q4 2022/23 average of 33. In Q1 last year the Fraud teams undertook a sweeping exercise of old Judicial outcomes. They finalised 186 in total through this process, and in addition one large NLF operation yielded 23 Judicial outcomes in this period.

Outcome 3: Investigate and Prosecute.

NLF Role: We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

Success Measures:

D. Through leadership of LFOR improve the coordination of Operational Activity across Policing to increase Pursue outcomes for victims.

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
National and International Coordination and Assistance

LFOR assisted other Forces and Regions with **11 requests for assistance** during Q2 2023/24. The requests were for arrests, warrants to be executed, supporting premises searches, the gathering of evidence as well as reconnaissance of premises. This is a key role of LFOR who provide Operational and Investigative support to all UK Forces and Regions to progress cases with enquiries in London. A high number of OCG activities that impact victims across the country have links to London, and by providing such support LFOR are supporting partners in expediting positive outcomes and disruption opportunities.

LFOR received and developed **10 cases** that were subject of **Case Acceptance Plans** for consideration by NLF Operations. This compares to 10 cases the previous quarter.

There have also been **46 International requests for assistance** from Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies. These are managed within LFOR, and during this quarter the highest number of requests were from Germany. The average time for completion for Q2 was 64 days which is well within the 90-day target.

LFOR coordinate the activity of the regional **Proactive Economic Crime Teams** and monitor their performance against agreed KPIs. During Q2 the PECT carried out 38 arrests, 21 voluntary interview and 166 alternat outcomes. They also submitted 163 intelligence reports and seized assets valued at £520,677. During Q2 LFOR staff visited the NWROCU, SWROCU and TARIEN PECT teams.







Outcome 4: Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

NLF Role: We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.


Success Measures:


- A. To increase the number of Social Media posts.
- B. To increase the reach of Social Media posts (impressions).



Across the various teams engaging on social media, the number of confirmed posts fell by just 7% to 422. The number of related impressions also fell, by 35% to 2,100,936. It is believed that the drop in impressions over the last 3 quarters is due to Facebook performing a platform 'cleanse', removing a number of Bot accounts. Action Fraud has engaged with new platforms, with 4.5k followers on Instagram, and is now active and verified on the Threads social media platform.

During the quarter, the Media Team oversaw 9 press releases and 3 interviews. Compared to the previous quarter, this represents a decrease for press releases, and a small increase for interviews. The media interviews included an interview on the links between counterfeiting and other crime for Camden New Journal and a feature for Modern Insurance Magazine. Press releases received coverage in local, national and trade media and included sentencing for cases including a crypto investment fraud and fraudulent invoices at a trading company in the City. Others included warrants carried out in Camden, counterfeit football shirts and NFL merchandise, sentencing of a ghost broker, and a confiscation order against a man who orchestrated fraudulent motor insurance claims.






Notable Social Media Campaigns

Press releases were issued by **PIPCU** celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Unit, and DS Andrew Masterson featured in CoLP's 'Who We Are' social media series. Additional posts promoted warrants executed in Manchester as part of an investigation into the distribution of counterfeit perfumes.

IFED issued press releases on social media regarding a sentencing in relation to fraudulent injury claims. Messaging in August raised awareness of moped 'crash for cash' fraud, and an insurance fraud deterrent animation was used in a digital ad campaign by the Insurance Fraud Bureau.

The **NLF Operational Teams** promoted regional teams' work on courier fraud.



Outcome 4: Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

NLF Role: We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.

Success Measures:

C. To deliver campaigns and participate in intensification periods to raise awareness and drive prevention activity.



Action Fraud

Student Safety Campaign The ongoing Action Fraud Student Safety Campaign which began in October, focuses on critical areas including rental fraud, cryptocurrency fraud, and recruitment scams. As of writing, the campaign has generated 15.8 million impressions and reached 6.1 million people. This initiative reflects Action Fraud's proactive approach to protecting students from digital threats as they begin university and college.

Best Performing Social Media Post of the Year (Wednesday, September 27th). A milestone moment in the Action Fraud digital journey was the release of their best ever performing social media post. This alert, highlighting free electricity scams, garnered extraordinary attention. Prior to the post, Action Fraud engaged in a strategic collaboration with TV personality Martin Lewis. The resulted in the post reaching a remarkable four million people with four million impressions — a new record for Action Fraud.

LFOR: Courier Fraud

During September LFOR supported **Op Grounded**, a courier fraud intensification run by the SWROCU. During the operation, a London based cell was identified Col P officers and assisted providing method of entry, investigators and search assistance.

One suspect was arrested and during the search of his home address LFOR officers found £17K which was seized by SWROCU.

NFIB Protect

Cyber Protect have spent the last few weeks planning and producing content for **Cyber Security Awareness month** (October). The goal of the campaign is to raise awareness of steps people can take to secure their email and social media accounts, such as enabling two-step verification #TurnOn2SV. Communications activity will be coordinated with partners across policing, government, and industry.

Cyber Protect are also currently working with the NCSC to finalise plans for this year's online shopping campaign, which will launch in early November.







Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

NLF Role: As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

Success Measures:

- A. To increase delegate training levels in the Economic and Cybercrime Academy.
- B. To maintain delegate satisfaction levels at 90% or above.




Training Courses

The ECCA delivered 11 training courses in Q2, a decrease of 50% from Q1 (-11). Historically the Academy do not deliver any courses over the summer season due to lower availability of trainers and delegates. The time is spent refreshing existing courses and working on new ones. This year a small number of courses were held in July and August, and numbers picked up throughout September.

The number of delegates, 129, represents a decrease of 53% from Q1 (-143). However, recovery was seen in September, and is expected to continue in Q3. This quarter, most delegates were from UK policing, with remainder from the public sector.






The Academy delivered an Internet Investigators Foundation course for City of London Police staff in the NFIB, ensuring staff have appropriate skills and providing career development.

A range of courses were delivered to law enforcement including money laundering courses to Police Scotland (PS) and the MoD, and an Introduction to Economic Crime to the NECC. A Fraud Investigators Foundation course was also delivered to the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Police Service (NAVCIS).

Future courses are expected to be delivered to PS and NAVCIS as well as internal CoI P teams.

Satisfaction for the quarter averaged at 94%, recovering from a drop in May to score consistently above the 22/23 benchmark. The percentage of delegates completing feedback also rose as trainers are now providing time for this process within the classroom.

The Academy is developing a strategy to monitor the impact of training on attendees and their roles, which will improve understanding of the impact of training. The ECCA is also running a recruitment campaign, actively onboarding new Associate Trainers with specific skill sets to ensure resilience across the courses, and to build capacity and enable more training to be delivered.



Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

NLF Role: As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

Success Measures:

. To collaborate with industry and partners to develop innovative new ways to better protect victims and disrupt serious offending.



CoLP forms part of a multitude of **inter-agency groups** who tackle fraud and cybercrime in partnership. We work closely with a wide range of law enforcement and government agencies, banks and industry partners. In Q2 2023/24:

With support from telecoms and cybersecurity partners, **DCPCU** executed search warrants across England regarding individuals sending out fake text messages to victims.

Officers from **Fraud Operations**, **ART**, and **DCPCU** attended the Home Office to speak about fraud investigations, police powers and legislation. **Fraud Ops** also presented at the Fraud and Financial Crime Summit held by the Centre for Financial Professionals and attended by UK and international banks, law firms and businesses.

IDT worked with key law enforcement partners, within the UK and Internationally to support Operations in high harms fraud. This included an FBI led international Romance Fraud and a SWROCU led Courier Fraud intensification. IDT presented at the Global Dating Insights Conference, a key events in the industry.



Spotlight on PIPCU and UK Border Force

PIPCU have launched an intelligence led operation aiming to disrupt counterfeit goods supply into the United Kingdom. This will offer new tactics to PIPCU, which has traditionally relied on reactionary tactics and stakeholder intelligence, usually targeted at end resellers and resulting in the costly storage of counterfeit goods evidence. PIPCU has obtained the support of UK Border Force and HMRC, as well as organisations and industry professionals on the periphery of law enforcement such as civil intellectual property lawyers. Foreign stakeholders are also keen to supply intelligence on organised crime groups based in, operating in, or organising the supply of counterfeit goods to and from China, the EU and the UK.

The operation is in its infancy but has already set up intelligence sharing with the Border Force Multi Agency Hub. This highlights counterfeit suppliers and shipments so Border Force can target its efforts. PIPCU have liaised with Border Force officers at mail sorting hubs and laid the groundwork for joint days of action targeting imports from specific companies or countries. This will bring targeted search capability to Border Force, as PIPCU can conduct searches which Border Force can seize and process.

A bespoke intelligence system with HMRC teams, Customs Risk & Data Analytics Team and the Data Sharing & Acquisition Team is being developed to bring the following capabilities:

- Access to data on importers and exporters providing historical and live time intelligence on shipments benefiting intelligence scoping and proactive investigations.
- Access to data on shipments being declared, providing PIPCU and HMRC with the ability to deny shipments before they are loaded into ships or aircraft.
- Access to shipments before couriers, allowing covert operatives full shipment availability to place trackers and control deliveries without alerting the couriers.
- Access to semi bulk data, allowing PIPCU to conduct informed and quality proactive investigations, disruptions and intelligence sharing.
- Access to support from HMRC with regards tracking shipments via other shipping routes used to evade UK customs and law enforcement.
- Shared intelligence with HMRC on counterfeit importers, highlighting tax evasion and misuse of the shipping and declaration systems, and highlighting weak points which may be exploited by other crime types.

Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

NLF Role: As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

Success Measures:

D. To improve the capacity to police fraud and cybercrime by implementing additional posts and improving attraction, recruitment and retention.



Establishment of a new Fraud Policing Network (PURSUE):


- There are 9 Regional Proactive Economic Crime Teams (PECTs) in place and enlargement of the London response (MPS and CoLP) is being implemented with a DI already in post, and recruitment for 1 DS and 2 DCs from CoLP to be completed in Q3. 3 DCs from the MPS will be recruited in early 2024/25.
- By the end of September 2023, 150 regional posts were in place across the network, representing 87% of the target by FYE 2023/24 (172 posts) achieved. This is across both the Police/SOC Uplift Programme and HMG Spending Review investment funding.
- The growth in investigative capacity in CoLP NLF Fraud Operations has resulted in 8 new Police Staff Investigators and a PSI Supervisor in place.
- 4 CoLP leadership posts are being recruited in 2023/24. A Communications lead is in place and a DI PECT Coordinator, Performance Lead and Intelligence Lead are being recruited. Recruitment for 2024-25 FY will be initiated by a number of Regions in Q3.

Notable operational examples include:

NWROCU Elderly vulnerable victim had their bank account compromised and £151,459 transferred to mule accounts across the North of England. Three account holders received a proportion of these funds and five money laundering charges authorised by CPS in respect of the suspects.

TARIAN Using extensive intelligence reports of suspected fraud and dark web activity, TARIAN PECT executed warrants at suspect's address and seized all electronic devices, gathering evidence and disrupting operations. The case is ongoing, and the team are moving towards charging the suspect.

NEROCU After reports of multiple courier frauds with the same MO, enquiries identified a vehicle through ANPR. Two suspected 'couriers' were arrested, and their phones seized, but they were uncooperative in interview. The investigation continues, to identify the 'voice' and 'controllers' of the OCG. To date 9 substantive offences totalling £74k have been identified where victims have handed cash to a courier or there has been a risk of loss.



Appendix A - Performance Assessment Criteria

In order to identify if these outcomes are being achieved a series of success measures for each outcome have been produced and are reported on throughout the period. The success measures related to each outcome can be found at the start of each slide alongside the current assessment for the relevant measure. These have been identified based on the data available, and whether the data is increasing or decreasing within the required tolerance level.

Success Measure Performance Assessment				
•	A green upwards arrow suggests improvement in the direction of travel.			
→	A green arrow pointing right is used for consistent performance at 100%.			
•	A green arrow pointing down means a decreasing trend which is positive.			
→	Amber means there has been limited increases or decreases within tolerance level.			
•	A red upwards arrow suggests an increasing trend that is negative.			
•	A red downward arrow suggests a decrease in performance.			

