

## FCA Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation – Policy Statement II

The matters relating to the reclassification of local and public authorities as retail are covered in Chapter 8 pages 64 to 74 of the full document

<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps17-14.pdf>

**Highlights** (see highlighted sections following for context)

1. Firms may take a collective view of the expertise, experience and knowledge of committee members, taking into account any assistance from authority officers and external advisers where it contributes to the expertise, experience and knowledge of those making the decisions
2. Governance and advice arrangements supporting those individuals can inform and contribute to the firm's assessment
3. Adherence to CIPFA Codes or undertaking other relevant training or qualifications may assist in demonstrating knowledge and expertise as part of the qualitative test
4. Rules will add a fourth criterion that the client is subject to the LGPS Regulation for their pension administration business. Local authorities must continue to meet the size requirement, as well as one of the two previous criteria or the new fourth criterion
5. Compliance with the LGPS Regulations, including taking proper advice, will contribute to the assessment of knowledge and expertise of the local authority client when making decisions
6. Retain the 10 transactions on average per quarter test as one of the four available criteria for enabling a local authority body to opt up.
7. Firms may reasonably assess that a professional treasury manager has worked in the financial sector for at least one year, if their role provides knowledge of the provision of services envisaged
8. Changed the portfolio size threshold to £10m
9. Proposed transitional arrangements that would allow investment firms to re-assess the categorisation of local authority clients between the 3 July 2017 implementation deadline and 3 January 2018 are being taken forward

### Page 67 Our response on the qualitative test

MiFID II requires the qualitative test to be applied to local authorities seeking to opt-up to professional client status, with the test itself unchanged from MiFID. It is important that an investment firm is confident that a client can demonstrate their expertise, experience and knowledge such that the firm has gained a reasonable assurance that the client is capable of making investment decisions and understanding the nature of risks involved in the context of the transactions or services envisioned.

COBS 3.5.4 requires that the qualitative test should be carried out for the person authorised to carry out transactions on behalf of the legal entity. 'Person' in this context may be a single person or a group of persons. We understand that the persons within a local authority who invest on behalf of pension funds are elected officials acting as part of a pensions committee. In those circumstances, firms may take a collective view of the expertise, experience and knowledge of committee members, taking into account any assistance from authority officers and external advisers where it contributes to the expertise, experience and knowledge of those making the decisions. We also understand that typically the person(s) within local authorities who invest the treasury reserves of those authorities are likely to be officers of the authorities, who are delegated authority from elected members and act under an agreed budget and strategy.

Given different governance arrangements, we cannot be prescriptive but we would stress the importance of firms exercising judgement and ensuring that they understand the arrangements of the local authority and the clear purpose of this test. It remains a test of the individual, or respectively the individuals who are ultimately making the investment decisions, but **governance and advice arrangements supporting those individuals can inform and contribute to the firm's assessment.**

We agree that **adherence to CIPFA Codes or undertaking other relevant training or qualifications may assist in demonstrating knowledge and expertise as part of the qualitative test.**

### **Page 68 Our response on the quantitative test – approach for Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPS)**

We recognise that local authority pension schemes are established within the framework of the LGPS Regulations and are subject to the oversight of the Pensions Regulator, as well as the broader public policy in MiFID II, such as ensuring that local authority pension schemes receive appropriate investment services, and that they understand the costs and risks involved with such service.

Some expressed concerns about interpreting the quantitative criteria in light of the common governance of local authority pension scheme administration, and recognise that the drafting of our proposed rules was not sufficient to achieve our policy intention of allowing all local authorities administering LGPS pension funds to have the ability to successfully opt up. **Therefore, our rules will add a fourth criterion that the client is subject to the LGPS Regulation for their pension administration business. Local authorities must continue to meet the size requirement, as well as one of the two previous criteria or the new fourth criterion.** This will assist all local authority pension fund administrators who wish to opt-up to meet the quantitative test, but maintain the need for local authorities to qualitatively demonstrate their sophistication to become professional clients. **We agree with views that compliance with the LGPS Regulations, including taking proper advice, will contribute to the assessment of knowledge and expertise of the local authority client when making decisions.**

### **Page 69 Our response on the quantitative test – undertaking 10 transactions on average per quarter**

We accept that some local authorities will not be able to meet this part of the quantitative test (particularly when investing pension funds). However, it continues to be our view that regular and recent experience of carrying out relevant transactions remains a useful proxy for assessing sophistication. We have received no arguments against this view, and so confirm that we will **retain this test as one of the four available criteria for enabling a local authority body to opt up.**

While theoretically this criterion could be 'gamed' by firms and clients by churning portfolios, we believe it is an unlikely course of action for local authorities who are accountable to the electorate and have specific statutory duties requiring prudent management of their financial affairs. In future, we could scrutinise any firm who appeared to be recommending this course of action to its client and question whether the firm was acting in the client's best interest and whether the firm believed that an artificially higher number of trades contributed to the expertise, experience and knowledge of their client.

### **Page 70 Our response on the quantitative test – employment in the financial sector for at least 1 year in a professional position**

We accept we could be clearer about who this test is applied to, while ensuring it can be applied flexibly to different governance arrangements. We also recognise that employment in the financial sector is a criterion that can only apply to a natural person.

In response, we have amended the proposed drafting in COBS 3.5.3BR(b)(ii) to note that 'the person authorised to carry out transactions on behalf of the client works or has worked in the financial sector for at least one year in a professional position, which requires knowledge of the provision of services envisaged'. This should allow local authorities to delegate authority to make investment decisions on their behalf to professional staff with at least one

year's experience. We recognise that this redrafted criterion may not be useful for assessing the collective decision making involved in investing local authority pension funds. However, we think this will be less problematic given our new fourth criterion aimed at LGPS administering authorities.

We do not interpret the term 'financial sector' in a limited way for the purposes of COBS 3.5.3BR(2)(b)(ii), and firms may reasonably assess that a professional treasury manager has worked in the financial sector for at least one year, if their role provides knowledge of the provision of services envisaged. This meets the purpose of the test, to ensure the person acting on behalf of a client has the expertise, experience and knowledge necessary in relation to the investment or service being sold and the risks involved.

### **Page 71 Our response on the quantitative test – portfolio size threshold**

**We have changed the portfolio size threshold to £10m.** This follows further data and case studies provided by local authorities, Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) new data, and wider CP responses.

We believe £10m is closer to our policy goal of restricting the ability of the smallest, and by implication the least sophisticated, local authorities (town and parish councils, and the smallest county and district councils) to opt-up, but giving larger ones the ability to do so more readily, (provided they meet the other criteria).

Based on the number of local authorities we estimated were investing in MiFID scope instruments and understanding the quoted portfolio size in the DCLG dataset for 2014/15, in CP16/29 we estimated that 63 additional local authorities would not be able to opt-up to professional client status for the purposes of engaging in MiFID business as a result of our consulted upon policy.

At a £15m portfolio size threshold, this increased to 78 additional local authorities which would not be able to opt-up to professional client status for the purposes of engaging in MiFID business when we used the new 2015/16 DCLG dataset.

Applying the £10m threshold to data over the following years:

- 2014/15 – 27 local authorities would not be able to opt-up to professional client status; and the estimated one-off costs for investment firms would decrease from £1.7m to £0.8m and on-going costs from £0.8m to £0.3m.
- 2015/16 – 42 local authorities would not be able to opt-up, and the one-off costs for investment firms would decrease from £2.0m to £1.1m, and on-going costs would reduce from £0.9m to £0.5m.<sup>47</sup>

While a local authority's ability to borrow extra funds to 'game' this requirement may be possible, it is questionable whether local authorities would be able to justify this approach while at the same time making budgets and investment strategies available for public scrutiny.

### **Page 74 Our response on transitional arrangements**

MiFID II gives us very limited discretion with regard to transitional arrangements for applying these rules in respect of local authorities and provides no ability to extend the deadline for compliance with this requirement beyond 3 January 2018. **We consulted in CP16/43 on proposed transitional arrangements that would allow investment firms to re-assess the categorisation of local authority clients between the 3 July 2017 implementation deadline and 3 January 2018. These proposals are being taken forward (see Chapter 24).** However, firms will not be expected to re-consider categorisation of existing clients other than local authorities, where MiFID II rules are the same as existing MiFID rules transposed at COBS 3.

Otherwise, we have made further consequential drafting changes to transitional provisions at COBS TP 1 that were added when MiFID was implemented in 2007, but that are no longer carried across into MiFID II.

More generally, COBS 3.5.8G notes that professional clients have the responsibility to keep investment firms informed about any changes that affect their current categorisation. Further,

## Appendix 2

at COBS 3.5.9R, if the firm becomes aware that the client no longer fulfils the initial conditions that made the client eligible to be an elective professional client, it must take “appropriate action”. Neither MiFID II, nor our rules specify what ‘appropriate action’ is, which will depend on the facts of the case and what would be in the client’s best interest. Firms must exercise judgement and consider what would be in the best interests of the client. For example, if a client no longer meets the quantitative test to opt up to professional client status, a firm may decide it is appropriate to cease providing investment services but to do so in a way that minimises losses to the client.